vol. 35 no.4 (140)
April 2012
small
alp forces
observer
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Argentine Canberra during the Malvinas Conflict
The Korean People’s Air Force: Part 4
Dutch Fokker F.VIIa/3mM Bombers
South & North Korean Spruce
F-51 Mustangs in the Congo
Dutch Markings & Colors
Fokker Type Numbers
Chinese MiG-9
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April 2012
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110
Small Air Forces Observer Vol.35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
SMALL AIR FORCES OBSERVER
The Journal of the Small Air Forces Clearing House
E-Mail: safo@redshift.com
CONTENTS
Abstracts.112
Argentine Canberra (Calcaterra).113
Dutch F.VIIa Bombers (Gerdessen).120
Fokker Type Numbers & LVA.124
Insignia and Colors (Gerdessen)
Korean People’s AF: Part 4 (Dildy).129
Chinese MiG-9 (Dildy).133
Korean Ki-9 Spruce (Scheve).134
Congo F-51 Mustangs (Hellstrom).137
Books.140
Fokker G-l
Decals.140
Brazil & Argentine PBYs
Estonian & Portuguese Harts
Guatemalan Ryan STM
Antarctic Helicopters
Letters.142
Hampton, Brozek, Risseeuw,
Overall
Disposals.142
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COVER COMMENTS: Fuerza Aerea
Argentina Canberra B-105 of II Brigada
Aerea at Air Base Parana in 1989.
Captain Bigua Daghero (navigator) and
Major Pastran (pilot). The experiences of
the Argentine Canberra during the
Mavinas War are described in this issue
by Pablo Calcaterra. (Bigua Daghero via
Marcelo Siri)
Canberra B-105 of IIBrigadaAerea at Air Base Parana showing the armament range available to the B Mk 62. At the extremities of
each wing are a pair of 1,0001b bombs on trolleys and in front is a spread of 251b practice bombs. (FAA via Marcello Siri)
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
111
-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-abstracts-
AUSTRIA
OFH NACHRICHTEN (Oesterrichishe
Flugzug Historiker, Pfenninggeldf
18/2/14, A-1160 Wien. Write for free
sample.)
4/11 (40 pages) Sud Aviation SE 210
Caravelle-Jet der Austrian Airlines” 11
pages including 2 color photos, 17 b&w
photos, 6 color profile drawings, and 5
tables listing history of each Austrian
Caravelle both before and after Austrian
Airline service. “MiG 21R in Zeltweg” 2
pages on Yugoslav MiG-21R including 4
photos and a profile drawing. “AVIS -
Flug aus der Vergangenheit” 2 pages
including 2 photos of Avis BS-11 ‘A-16’.
BELGIUM
KIT (IPMS Belgium, c/o Michel Willot,
dreve de Champagne 14, B-1190
Bruxelles; French & Flemish.
International Postal Money Order for $30
for 4 issues.
#163 (52 pages) “Skyhawk in Belgian
colours” 6 pages on modeling a US
Marine Corps A-4E carrying a Belgium
roundel including 6 photos and 2 color
profile drawings. “Walkaround: A-4
Skyhawk” 4 pages with 9 photos.
“Servans in Periculo” 4 pages on building
a Dutch AB-412 in SAR markings
including 9 photos of the model. “Close-
up: AB-412 SAR” 7 photos of Dutch
SAR helicopter.
FINLAND
MALLARI (IPMS Finland, PL 798,
00101 Helsinki; 4 issues $30.00 surface
mail; $37.00 airmail. No checks. Text in
Finnish, www.ipmsfmland.org.
#182 (20 pages) “Supermarine Spitfire
Mk XIX” 2 pages on Swedish S31
including 5 photos. “Spitfire PRXIX” 2
pages on the 1/72-scale Airfix kit
including 8 photos (6 in color) of
museum a/c. “Mil Mi-24V/VP” 2 pages
on the 1/72-scale Zvezda kit including 6
photos (2 of the kit and 4 color photos of
Soviet machines).
#183 (20 pages) “Avro Anson Mk.I in the
Finnish Air Force” 7 pages including 7
photos, a 1/72-scale 3-view drawing, 3
color profile drawings, and a color top-
view drawing.
#184 (20 pages) “Avro Anson Mk.I” a 3-
page continuation of Anson in FAF
service including 2 photos, 3 color profile
drawings, and a color top-view drawing.
“Domier-museo” 4 pages on a visit to the
Domier Museum at Friedrichshaffen
including 15 photos.
FRANCE
AVIONS: Toute l’Aeronautique et son
Histoire (Lela Presse, 29 rue Paul Bert,
62230 Outreau, France. 50 euro for 6
issues). Website: www.avions-
bateaux.com. E-mail: contact@avions-
bayeaux.com.
#185 Janvier-Fevrier 2012 (72 pages)
“FFS A/B 123: l’avenement des pilotes
croates” 14 pages on training Croatian
pilots in Germany including 38 photos
(all Luftwaffe a/c). “Les ‘tagazoux’ de la
CAP s’en vony en guerre” 9 pages
including 22 photos. [Ed: The Civilian
Air Patrol (CAP) was not a small air
force, but a model of a Stinson 10A
bearing their insignia (a white equilateral
triangle inscribed within a black disc)
will get your fellow modelers scratching
their heads.] “Le groupe de chasse
polonais III/3 en septermbre 1939 (fin)”
10 pages including 24 photos (8
personnel, 7 Polish a/c, & 9 Luftwaffe
a/c), table of Polish victories, and a graph
of sorties by day. “1914-1918: La chasse
frangaise en Orient (part 3)” 14 pages
including 38 photos, a map of the
Salonika front, and 4 color profiles
(Greek Ni-27, French Ni-24, Italian Ni-
24, & Serbian Ni-24). “Les hydravions
des avisos coloniaux (part 2)” 12 pages
on pre-WW2 ship-born French a/c
including 18 photos and 4 color profile
drawings [Gourdou-Leseurre 832 (3) &
one Potez 452]. “L’itineraire d’un
mecanicien de l’Armee de l’Air (part 4):
Indochine, Algerie et ... retiur a Persan-
Beaumont” 25 photos on the post-WW2
career of Robert Rohr.
GERMANY
FLIEGER REVUE EXTRA (Verlag
Fliegerrevue, Herm Detlief Billig,
Oraniendamm 48, D-13469 Berlin. 4
issues per year, $66 surface. Payment by
check drawn on German bank.
#35 (114 pages) “Der deutschen
Torpedoflieger - Teil 3” 30 pages on
Luftwaffe torpedo planes during the
Spanish Civil War including 38 photos
(He 59, He 60, Ar 95, He 111, & He
115). “Russlands fliegende
Radarschirme” 28 pages on Russian
“early warning” a/c carrying big radar
dishes including 41 photos and 3 multi¬
view color drawings (Tu-126, An-71, &
Jak-44E). “1940/41 - Luftkampf um
Indochina” 24 pages including 34 photos,
one map (showing such exotic locations
as Chochinchina, Annam, Tonking, Lao,
& Khmer-Reich: priviouslt know to me
only from postage stamps), several tables
showing air orders of battle, and 24 color
profile drawings [French: MS 406 (5),
Potez 25 (5); Potez 633, CMS 37,
Farman 221, Loire 130, Potez 452, Potez
542 (2), DH-82. Thai: Curtiss H-75N,
Curtiss Hawk III, Vought V-93S Corsair,
Martin 139WS (2). Japanese: Ki 48 Lily
& Ki 27 Nate.] [Ed: one Martin 139
carries Thai roundels and the other the
rectangular Thai flag, but both have a red
disc with an inscribed white elephant on
the fuselage. Also of great interest is a
photo of a Ki-30 Ann with Thai
roundels.] “Vom Kolibri zum Sea Lynx”
24 pages on German ship-borne
antisubmarine helicopters including 48
photos and technical descriptions of
tactics.
ITALY
JP4 Menslie di Aeronautica e Spazio.
Via XX Settembre, 60-50129 Firenza,
Italy. Email: jp4@dueservice.com.
Website: www.ediservice.it.
Novembre 2011 (100 pages) Photos:
Egypt Airbus Military C295 ‘083’ and
India Boeing P-81 ‘IN320’. “H-6: The
Last Bomber” 4 pages including 7 photos
of the Chinese version of the Tu-16
Badger. “Incidenti Militari” 1 page
including 3 photos (Angola EMB-120 &
Su-22M-4)
Dicembre 2011 (100 pages) Photos:
Bulgarian Navy AS565 Phanter and
Afghan Cessna 208. “Aviacion del
Ejercito de Colombia”6 pages 12 photos
(Blackhawk, Cessna 208, & CASA
C.212). “L’aviazione della Polizia
Federale Tedesca” 6 pages including 11
photos (EC155, AS332, EC135, &
EC120). “Adequate Response 2011” 2
pages with 8 photos of Ukrainian Su-27,
Su-24, Su-25, & MiG-29. “Royal
Bahraini Air Force” 6 pages including 10
photos (F-16, F-5, BAC Hawk, Slingby
T-67, S-70 Blackhawk, Avro RJ85,
Bo.105, AH-1, & AB212). “Incidenti
Militari” VA page including 4 photos
[Bangledesh A-5C, Kenya Hughes 500,
South Korea MD369, & Tianchi(?) BZK-
006].
112
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
EE Canberra BMk62 of the Fuerza Aerea Argentina
Pablo Calcaterra
After a successful tour of Latin America in 1952
during which the Canberra was shown off to the
regional Air Forces, the type was purchased by
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The Argentine Air
Force tried to do the same. However, geopolitical
considerations and some recent bad incidents (an
Argentine Navy Catalina landed on Deception Island,
an Avro Lincoln flying over the Antarctic continent,
among others) were enough for the British authorities
to reject the request. In 1965, contact was
reestablished and a package that included Canberras
and some Vickers VC 10 for Aerolineas Argentinas
was negotiated. But, the U.S. government lobbied
against this and finally the Argentine airline
purchased Boeing 707s. Thus, the second chance for
Argentina to obtain Canberras was lost. By that time,
the fleet of Argentine Avro Lincoln was clearly
outclassed and the Air Force badly needed planes to
restore the balance of power in the region.
In 1967, negotiations were again moving forward,
but these were terminated as tensions between
Argentina and Chile escalated and Queen Elizabeth II
was asked to mediate. Therefore, the British could not
be seen as siding with Argentina by selling them
armament that could be used against Chile.
Finally, a transaction took place in 1969 when
Argentina purchased 12 BMk2 and 2 TMk4 ex RAF.
These planes were completely inspected (adding 25
years to their life) and after 10 major and 14 minor
modifications requested by Argentina were made,
they became Mk62 and Mk64 respectively. These
modifications included communications, navigation,
and external load equipment. The planes each had
between 1,200 and 3,600 hours when purchased. The
original planes and their Argentine serial numbers
are:
msn
Ex RAF
Argentina
HP182P
WJ616
B-101
71233
WJ713
B-102
71234
WJ714
B-103
SH1656
WH913
B-104
71165
WH702
B-105
HP176P
WJ609
B-106
71203
WH727
B-107
SH1613
WH886
B-108
72373
WH875
B-109
HP186B
WJ619
B-110
71416
WT476
B-lll
71371
WJ875
B-112
The “lost” lot (purchased in 1981 but withheld and
never delivered by BAC due to the 1982 conflict)
SHI657 BMk2
to Mk92
WH914
?
XH583 TMk4
to TMk64
XH583
?
A BAC test pilot flew the first modified plane in
1970. In the meantime, a group of pilots were being
trained on Peruvian Canberras. Another group of 12
pilots was trained in England. Upon ending their
training, these latter crews flew the planes to their
new home. On November 17, 1970, the first three
Canberras, B-101 to B-103, arrived in Argentina.
During 1971, with the availability of the two
trainers, crews started to be trained in-country while
the squadron was gaining proficiency. The squadron
was based in BAM Parana (Entre Rios) and
constituted part of the II Brigada Aerea.
The first Canberra was lost in 1971 when B-103
crashed during a touch-and-go training exercise, but
luckily the crew survived albeit with injuries.
During 1978, tensions again increased and
Argentina and Chile were on the brink of war. The
Canberras were transferred to Espora Naval Air Base
(Bahia Blanca) but, as it is well known, the situation
was defused by the intervention of Pope John Paul II.
The next plane to be lost was B-109, which
crashed during a summer storm in 1979. The pilot
survived but the navigator perished.
The Malvinas Conflict
Now the timeline brings us to 1982 when the
conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom
over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) took place. At
this time there were 10 Mk62 and 2 Mk64 in service,
but only six and one, respectively, were ready for
action. The balance was undergoing maintenance and
tests. The first two planes (B-104 and B-110) were
sent to Argentine Navy base Almirante Zar in Trelew
(Chubut province) on April 10 th . Three days later, it
was the turn of B-105 and B-lll. This became the
primary base for operations and advanced
maintenance. When B-108 and 109 arrived on April
16 th , training to attack ships with Mkl7 bombs
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
113
started. On April 21 st , four planes (B-104, B-105, B-
109, and B-110) flew over the Islands to familiarize
the crews with the new environment and find critical
navigation points. This type of operation was repeated
several times before May 1 st . During this time, a
locally-designed chaff and flare dispenser was
installed under the planes in the area of the
photographic cameras housing.
(For the remainder of this article, I am going to
focus on the missions that B-105 flew. I will also
describe other missions where B-105 might not have
been involved but were, nevertheless, significant or
interesting. Please note that there were more OF
(Note 1) and missions than the ones I am writing
about.)
April 25 th
On this date Operation Paraquat started (the
retaking of the South Georgia Islands) and a counter
attack was launched against the British Task Force.
Three planes took of from Base Almirante Quijada
(Rio Grande) on April 26. Due to the distance
involved, an internal fuel tank with 3,300 It. was
installed in the bomb bay along with the wing tip
tanks. Therefore, only two 1,000-lb Mkl7 bombs
could be carried under the wings. After the attack, the
planes were to land at Puerto Argentino/Stanley
(Malvinas) to refuel and then continue to the
continent. Navigation support was given by a Boeing
707 and a KC-130H Hercules from I Brigada Aerea
provided tactical control. The Canberras involved
were B-105 (Squadron Leader Mj. Vivas and Capt
Escudero), B-108 (Sproviero/Moreno) and B-109
(Baeza/Cardo). Capt. Casado gave the navigator of B-
109 some calculations that showed that in case the
fuel ran out, if they were at 12,500 meters altitude,
they could glide another 160 nm without engines. No
piece of helpful information was left out! On the 26 th ,
the moment arrived. The planes were even refueled
on the runway before taking off to make up for the
consumption from start up until arriving at the
runway. They flew at 35,000 feet to reduce fuel
consumption. South of the Malvinas, while in
complete radio silence, they jettisoned their wing tip
tanks. But, one of B-105’s tanks did not release. Since
fuel consumption would become too high command
was turned over to Capt Baeza in B-109, and B-105
returned to base. The two remaining planes continued
with the mission. When the 707 broke formation, the
Canberras dove to the surface of the sea for their last
leg. The crews were worried about suffering damage
by small antiaircraft fire that would not allow them to
return to their base due to lack of fuel. (They didn’t
worry about a missile strike since it was thought that
it would destroy them immediately) Upon reaching
the target area, there was significant cloud cover and
the Hercules crew was only able to inform them that
there were two warships in Cumberland Bay, but
there were no details as to exactly where they were.
Clouds were also hiding the hills around the bay -
therefore, the mission was aborted.
They managed to regain contact with the Boeing
that guided them to Puerto Argentino. When they
were 150 km away from the airport they checked their
remaining fuel and realized that they could return
straight to the continent with no need for an
intermediate stop. The planes returned to Rio Grande.
Another mission was prepared for the following day,
but since the Argentine garrison on South Georgia
had already surrendered, it was cancelled when the
planes were ready to take off.
May 1 st
On this day, the fighting war really started around
the Islands. As it was assumed that British troops
were getting ready to land around Puerto Argentino
and that there were landing craft in the area, it was
decided to send two Canberra missions against them.
OF 1111: Call sign RUTA with B-105 (Capt
Nogueira/Sanchez), B-108 (Capt Rodino/l st Lt
Dubroca), and B-109 (1 st Lt Lozano/Lt Cooke). They
took off from Trelew and flew south east, but they did
not know that in their path HMS Yarmouth and HMS
Brilliant were chasing the Argentine submarine ARA
San Luis that had fired torpedoes against a British
warship (they did not explode). The ship’s radars
detected the incoming Canberras and they fired some
surface-to-air missiles. The bomber crews could see
the ships in the distance and their missiles being fired.
A Sea Cat fired by Yarmouth exploded close to B-108
and destroyed the wing tip as if it were made of
paper. B-108 almost hit the sea. Rodino radioed, “I
have been hit. I cannot control it. I am going to the
Island!” By violent maneuvering, he avoided the rest
of the missiles. Then, on route to the Island, he found
himself almost on top of the aircraft carrier, HMS
Invincible , from which Harriers were taking off. So
he turned around again and this time he decided to try
to return to the continent. He arrived in Puerto
Deseado (Santa Cruz) while the other, undamaged,
planes returned one hour later to their base (Trelew,
further north). B-108’s wingtip was repaired by
114
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
civilian millwrights and was able to return to action
before the end of the war.. .more about B-108 latter.
The other Canberra mission on this day was OF
1117: Call sign RIFLE with B-102 (Capt Baigorri/Mj
Rodeyro), B-110 (1 st Lt Gonzalez/Lt. De Ibanez), and
B-104 (Capt. Garcia Puebla/1 st Lt Segat). They
listened on their radio to the conversation and shouts
given by RUTA during their engagement. RIFLE was
flying in clouds and the tension was so high that they
did not realized they legs were shaking, that their
seats were uncomfortable, or even that they were
sweating a lot! Garcia Puebla, in B-104, noticed that
RIFLE 2 was flying slightly higher than the other two
Canberras. He told him: “RIFLE 2, come lower!”
When they were 300 km away from the target, HMS
Invincible detected them and a CAP of Sea Harriers
(Lt. Cdr. Broadwater in ZA175 and Lt. Curtis in
XZ451) was launched against them. Garcia Puebla, in
B-104, had decided to lag behind to avoid the
explosion of the bombs of the two planes ahead of
him during the attack. When the Canberras were only
24 km away from the carrier (they did not know that
HMS Invincible was just ahead of them) the SHAR
(Note 2) pilots gained the tail of the bombers. At that
moment, something made Garcia Puebla look to his
right more than he would normally and comfortably
do. From the bottom of a cloud, a fine white smoke
streak appeared. It was the first Sidewinder fired by
Curtis. The missile was flying very fast and parallel to
RIFLE 3, towards RIFLE 1 (B-102). Garcia Puebla
shouted: “Pajaro, abrite, un misil!” (Bird - Baigorri’s
nickname - break, a missile!). Baigorri answered with
an order to his wingmen: “Ruptura! (Break!)” Garcia
Puebla pushed the throttle thru the gate and kicked his
rudder pedal to his left while pulling and turning the
steering in the same direction. He told his navigator to
drop his flares and chaff every 15 seconds. The sea
was just inches away from his left wing tip, but he
was able to keep his eyes on the incoming missile. At
the same time RIFLE 1 was turning to the right.
RIFLE 2 (B-110) was flying slightly higher and not
turning as violently as the other two Canberras.
Garcia Puebla shouted: “Guarda el 2, GUARDA EL 2
(Watch out 2, WATCH OUT 2!!)” Then: “Vire carajo
(Turn, damn it!)” and “Dios! (God!)” The missile
entered B-llO’s right engine, but it did not explode.
RIFLE 3 lost sight of RIFLE 2 due to his turn, but the
leader was able to see two ejection seats coming out
and their parachutes deploying. Curtis fired another
Sidewinder at B-110, but it missed as the Canberra
had already impacted the sea. Broadwater fired
missiles at the other Canberras with no effect
although a Sea Lynx in the area reported that he had
hit another bomber so Broadwater was credited with a
kill.
During the engagement, Segat, in B-104, told his
pilot to jettison their wing tip tanks. It was good
advise since, with the tanks in place, the Canberra
could not exceed 700 km/hr. Three times the pilot
tried to eject them, but due to the Gs he was pulling,
he only managed to get rid of them on the fourth try.
The Canberra lurched forward and at the same time
an explosion was felt in the tail area. lust a few
instants before Segat had dropped another flare.
Garcia Puebla thought they had been hit, but after
checking the instruments he realized the plane was
still in good shape. It is believed that the flare that
Segat launched a fraction of a second earlier had
managed to attract the Sidewinder thus saving the
Canberra. Garcia Puebla asked his leader what to do
and he was told to return to base individually and to
get rid of his bombs. Thus, they were able to increase
their speed even more.
While Garcia Puebla was trying not to crash
against the waves and was fighting the vibrations,
Segat was checking the speed. This allowed him to
warn his pilot that they were exceeding the maximum
allowed speed. They were doing more than 950 km/hr
- maximum speed to avoid structural damage is 850
km/hr! Lowering the speed, Garcia Puebla flew even
closer to the sea. After some minutes they realized
that they had lost the attackers. Later on their relief
became anguish. In the fading light they saw on the
misty sea that gray ships were surrounding them and
there was no way out. Since they were close to the
continent, they finally realized the ships were part of
the Argentine Navy. Garcia Puebla told his Navigator
to get in touch with the “Navis” while he was
checking outside in case they came under attack (blue
on blue). Segat called “LOBO - MATIENZO” and
immediately they received several requests to confirm
their idenity. This being done, they also reported that
the Harriers had intercepted them and that there was a
Canberra crew waiting to be rescued in the sea. The
Argentine Navy sent Aviso Alferez Sobral (Note 3) to
the rescue. The two RIFLES returned to their base
where the mood was somber. They all went to their
chapel to pray and then, with their spirits restored,
they prepared for the follow-on missions. De Ibanez
and Gonzalez were never found.
Contrary to some versions still on the Internet
(Note 4) that claim the Aviso Somallera was sunk,
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
115
only the Aviso Alferez Sobral was attacked by British
helicopters. During a night combat the bridge Sabral
destroyed and the commander along with seven crew
members were killed. However, after several days at
sea, the Sobral managed to get back to the continent.
With a new bridge, she is still in service in the
Argentine Navy.
From now on, all attacks by Argentine Canberras
were to take place at night. Also a change to BAM
Rio Gallegos as a base to launch the attacks was
implemented. This decision left the planes 1,200 km
away from Trelew.
Once the British troops had landed at San Carlos
Strait on May 21, the first mission took place on May
26 th
May 26 th
OF ?: call sign ODIN with four Mkl7 bombs
each. B-104 (1 st Lt Mauad/Siri), B-105 (Capt.
Bredeston/Capt. Sisco/Piazza), and B-108
(Freijo/Marin). After flying 180 nm the attack was
called off due to lack of visibility.
May 27 th
OF 1240: call sign ODIN. With four Mkl7 bombs
each, B-101 (Mj Vivas/Capt Escudero) and B-104
(Capt Freijo/Capt Marin). Even though B-105 was not
involved in this mission, I want to mention it because
it was the first effective Canberra bombing mission.
Flying very low and in high winds, the two bombers
flew from south to north over San Carlos Strait
(Falkland Sound). After passing Darwin on their
right, they dropped their wing-tip tanks and
accelerated. They arrived over the beachhead using
the Doppler radar of B-101 and, close to the pier they
dropped their bombs on small fires seen on the
ground (troop concentrations?). They did not receive
any antiaircraft fire and escaped at 1,000 ft for almost
150 nm. During the mission they kept absolute radio
silence and they communicated using only their
formation lights.
May 31 st
OF 1260: call sign CHARRUA. Again with four
Mkl7 bombs each: B-102 (Capt Martinez Villada/l st
Lt Pagano), and B-105 (1 st Lt Rivollier/l st Lt
Annino). They were to bomb San Carlos again. When
they got to San Carlos at 0200, blanket of fog was
hiding the target. Therefore, they bombed, using
Doppler, from 700 to 800 feet and at a speed of 400
knots. Rivollier was able to see the eight blasts in the
middle of the night. There was no defensive fire
again.
OF 1270: call sign ODIN. Same armament as in
previous missions: B-105 (Capt Bredeston/Capt
Sisco) and B-109 (1 st Let Mauad/l st Lt Acosta). They
followed up another mission (OF 1269) led by Capt
Pastran and Cap Casado that bombed San Carlos
effectively. ODIN arrived over the target, dropped
their bombs with no problems and returned to Rio
Gallegos. There was lots of rain in the target area. As
a result of these missions, a tent at Eagle Base was
demolished and a phone central was damaged.
Although there was no damage to the Sea Kings
found on the base, there were casualties among the
British troops. Because of these attacks, the Sea
Kings were deployed back to the ships during the
night.
Capt. Carballo, the famous Skyhawk pilot and
who was from the same promotion as Bredeston, tells
the following anecdote. It turns out that Bredeston
was frustrated that he had not been able to complete a
mission or hit the enemy positions during previous
nights. Finally, during the one just described, he was
able to fulfill his duty and with a big smile he was
able to go to sleep. Having learned of the success of
the mission, Capt. Carballo and Capt. Perroto (a C-
130 pilot also from the same Promotion) entered the
room in the wee hours, grabbed some flying boots
and pounded poor Bredeston by surprise! Nice way to
congratulate him!!
OF 1273: call sign HUINCA. In this case the
bomb load was reduced to three per plane: B-108 (Mj
Chevalier/l st Lt Lozano), B-105 (Capt. Bertoldi/l st Lt
Reyes), and B-109 (Capt Garcia Puebla/l st Lt Segat).
B-105 had to return, as one of the fuel tanks was not
transferring its contents to the engines. Segat tells
some details about the mission: After adopting a high-
low profde, they entered clouds and they could not
see the sky nor the sea. He was calling out the
directions to Garcia Puebla “to the right...to the
left...higher, lower, not so much...” They could see
nothing outside. They were to the south of Soledad Is.
(East Falkland) and they turned north to start their
bombing run. The radar altimeter, showing 50 meters,
started to give different readings. This meant that they
were now flying over ground. He kept on asking his
pilot if he was able to see anything outside, but the
answer was always negative. It was getting even
darker! Suddenly, Garcia Puebla said: “I can see a
white shadow ahead” to which Segat shouted back:
“Climb! Climb!” It was Mount Kent. The Gs pushed
them against their seats. The radar was showing the
presence of the mount just ahead of them, all covered
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Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
in snow. They opened the bomb bay doors and
dropped their load. The plane shook with the
explosions and they could see the red glow behind.
Now they were 1,000 ft high and therefore they were
vulnerable to interception. They dove to 60 meters
and then Segat told Garcia Puebla to steer 030 to
return to their base. The radar in Puerto Argentino
was tracking them, but was unable to communicate
directly with the Canberras. Two minutes after their
attack, the radar tried to tell them that Harriers were
after them, but there was no direct contact. In such a
desperate situation, Puerto Argentino called the
continent that in turn, thru Rio Gallegos, managed to
contact the Canberras. Andy McHarg from HMS
Hermes had been launched and vectored in order to
chase the Canberras. Garcia Puebla saw a missile to
their right and told his navigator: “Drop the chaff!”
Segat dropped flares and chaff at different intervals.
The Canberra crew felt an explosion behind them that
is believed was the explosion of a surface-air missile
that had been lured by the antimissile measures. By
now McHarg was really close to the Canberras. His
fuel situation, though, was critical having flown very
far away from his mother ship. He managed to
identify the Canberras visually (he was now only 4
miles behind). When the explosion happened the
Canberra dropped their wing tip tanks and
accelerated. McHarg saw the enemy dropping their
tanks and pulling away, but he was not able to
continue with the chase and returned to HMS Hermes.
(He does not mention any explosion behind the
bombers.) The Canberra reached their height for their
return leg and returned to base safely.
June 4 th
OF 1276: Call sign PUMA with B-105 (Capt
Freijo/l st Lt Pagano) and B-101 (lstl Lt Heredia/1 st Lt
Gerez). They dropped their bombs on their target
(Mount Kent) using their Doppler radar and with their
position validated by the Argentine radar in Puerto
Argentino (Stanley). PUMA 1 pulled ahead during
their escape from the area, but then reduced speed to
wait for PUMA 2 to catch up. The radar (CIC)
warned them that there was an enemy CAP 25 miles
behind The Canberras accelerated to Mach 0.85. The
CAP stopped chasing them when they were 18 nm
behind. Over Darwin, now in British hands, they
dropped flares and chaff. But their adventures were
not over. Over Gran Malvina (West Falkand) they
were informed that there was yet another CAP
hunting them. They dropped chaff and flares and
finally were able to see their enemies, which turned
out to be two missiles - not Harriers. These missiles
had lost tracking and were easily left behind. The
Bombers returned to base without any more
adventures.
June 8 th
The Canberras flew one of the most controversial
missions of the war. They were based for a day in
Mar del Plata and from there they took off in the
afternoon. Six hundred miles from the Argentine
coast, the Liberian tanker Hercules was identified as a
potential supply ship for the British Task Force by C-
130 TC-68. The empty 220,000 tons super tanker was
on its way to Alaska to get another load of crude.
According to the captain of the ship, jet bombers (the
Canberras?) dropped eight bombs, one of which hit
the ship but did not explode. The ship sailed to Rio de
Janeiro (Brazil) to get the bomb defused. On July 20 th
the ship was sunk off coast of Brazilian coast -
allegedly to claim the insurance money. The
Argentine Air Force denied that the attack ever
occurred. The planes allegedly involved were B-102,
B-105 (Chevalier/Pagano), B-108, and B-109 and it is
believed that they each carried two Mkl7 bombs. The
shipping company sued the Argentine Air Force in
the US Supreme Court, but the case was dismissed.
For a while, B-105 carried the kill mark of a ship on
her nose.
June 10 th
OF 1309 with call sign LEON: B-105 (Capt
Martinez Villada/Mj Escudero) and B-112 (1 st Let
Rivollier/l st Lt Annino). As the wingman could not
take off, the leader joined TIGRE 1, another Canberra
whose wingman also failed to take off. Their target
was again Mount Kent. After seeing lights at low
height over the sea and when they were getting close
to their target, the Puerto Argentino radar told them to
return as there were air threats in areas around them.
The mission was not completed.
June 12 th
OF 1310, call sign TAURO: B-lll (Mj Vivas/l st
Lt Rocco) and B-105 (Capt. Pastran/Capt Casado).
They flew low over the sea towards their target. As
they turned to approach the area west of Puerto
Argentino (Stanley), they tried to drop their wing-tip
tanks, but the ones on the left in each plane failed to
release. Therefore, they were forced to return to their
base.
OF 1315; call sign ROMA: B-105 (1 st Lt
Rivolier/1 st Lt Annino) and B-1 xx (1 st Lt Heredia/1 st
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
117
Lt Gerez). They reached the southern part of San
Carlos Sound, but they were forced to return as they
saw some missiles being fired ahead of them. The
leader’s altimeter was not working and the low
temperatures caused frost to form over their canopies
and they were not able to see outside.
OF 1316; call sign BERLIN: B-104 (Capt
Martinez Villada/l st Lt Pagano) and B-102 (Capt
Garcia Puebla/l st Lt Segat). The leader returned with
a faulty fuel system and Garcia Puebla continued to
the target alone. Though B-105 was not involved in
this attack, it is a very interesting one so I am going to
go thru it using Garcia Puebla’s report.
Feeling lonely after loosing their leader due to a
mechanical issue, they continued with the mission.
Their target was close to the Argentine positions and
they were concerned about hitting them by mistake.
They started to descend and they prayed an Our
Father asking the Lord to allow them to get to their
target and if possible to hit it. Now flying very low
they flew in and out of clouds and rain with zero
visibility. Using their radar, they were able to turn
towards their target. They checked their remaining
fuel and found out that it was lower than what it
should be so they reduced their speed which would
allow them to get to the target and back to base but
would also make them more vulnerable to the enemy
antiaircraft fire. When the clouds broke, they could
see enemy ships on both sides! They further lowered
their height and their altimeter was reading zero.
Garcia Puebla was keeping his height using the
reflection of the moon on the surface of the sea. He
changed the direction in order to try to minimize their
exposure to the enemy frigates while flying with
enemy ships 8 miles to each side. They were finally
able to leave the ships behind. Segat started to doubt
his navigation equipment and that could be the
explanation of the higher than expected fuel
consumption and the presence of the enemy ships.
Accepting Segat’s comment meant failure, but Garcia
Puebla told his navigator not to worry, as he was sure
they were going to hit their target. Segat answered
that he believed him although all evidence was
against them! With the cockpit and instruments lights
off to improve their night vision, flying in and out of
rain in the middle of the night, they were lost.
Suddenly there was a distant light shining low to their
left. It could be either a star or a fire. It would be their
last chance to find the islands. One minute later, they
realized it was a fire. It was Kent Mount. Garcia
Puebla exclaimed, “We’ve got them!”
He called the radar in Puerto Argentino (Stanley),
but received no answer. They started to see some of
the shapes of the island in the middle of the dark
when, suddenly, there were lots of lights ahead and to
the left. They had turned on all the lights in the town!
With that help, Garcia Puebla was able to pinpoint the
target that was located between the town and Mount
Kent. He climbed slightly to start his bombing run
and to avoid the hills behind the target. At that
moment the radar came alive warning them:
“Message to the plane that is arriving from the north.
There are two CAPS flying towards you”. The
Argentines believe that the frigates had not fired
because they had passed the information to the
aircraft carriers. They dropped their bombs in the
correct spot, the plane jumped, and they could see the
red sky and feel the explosion of the bombs. It was 20
minutes after midnight on June 13 th . They were told
that one of the Harriers was close to Mount Kent and
had turned south. The Canberra crew turned off the
radar. They had crossed head on with the Harriers!
After he passed over the hills the pilot dove and
shouted to his navigator: “Jorge, grab the top ejection
handle and if you feel a hard vibration, eject. Don’t
wait for my order as they are hot on us!” Garcia
Puebla accelerated to maximum speed and was about
to eject his wing tip tanks to improve his escape speed
when he remembered that there a few left back at the
base, so he decided to keep them. He had two
chances: to eject them and disobey his orders or to
keep on flying fast risking the plane due to structural
damage or the lack of fuel. He decided to reduce his
speed to 380 kt to save fuel. When he did this, he
though: “I am giving too much advantage to the
British!” His eyes were jumping from the water to his
tail and back to the sea. He was also grabbing his
ejection handle when looking forward but had to let it
go when looking behind. Still flying low, they had
two options: either fly low over San Carlos risking
being shot down by the Harrier or start to climb to
save fuel. He picked the second option while Segat
was telling him how many miles they had flown since
they had left their target. With this he was wondering
how much longer would the Harriers chase them?
Thirty miles from their target, Garcia Puebla started
to climb while he said: “Well my friend, let it be
God’s will!” At that moment, the entire cockpit was
lit and they heard a noise. He thought it was the end,
but then realized that it was Saint Elmo’s fire.
Minutes passed very slowly. Eighty miles. Still not
caught. it seemed unbelievable. Garcia Puebla
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Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
exclaimed that he believed that they were going to
make it, but Segat told him that they were lost, as his
navigation equipment was not working. Now they
were flying at 40,000 ft and their only chance was for
the radars on the continent to find them. Their only
alternative was to eject in the middle of the night in
the South Atlantic. He started to call the radar on all
the frequencies. Finally he was answered:
“Continue!” They shouted with happiness when the
radar operators told them that they were on their
screens. Now that they were sure they were going to
make it they started to think about their families.
When they landed they shouted: “Long live the
Fatherland!”, which was echoed by the radar and the
tower. It was 2 am on June 13 th . A message was
received from the islands thanking them for their
effort and telling them that the bombing had been
very successful. With the happiness of having
fulfilled their mission they went to sleep.
I have transcribed this mission in detail to show
the courage and will of this Argentine Canberra crew.
June 13 th
The last mission of the Canberras was flown
around midnight on the 13 th when B-109
(Rivollier/Annino) and B-108 (Capt. Pastran/ Casado)
bombed Mount Kent. A Sea Dart fired by HMS
Exeter shot down the second plane, the same one that
had been damaged on May 1 st. Pastran told Casado to
eject but Casado answered that his seat was not
working (probably damaged by the explosion of the
missile). After loosing control of the plane, Pastran
told his friend that he had no other option but to eject
but he received no answer from Casado. Pastran fell
in the water, inflated his dinghy, and managed to get
to the coast where he was captured by British troops.
Casado crashed with his plane thus becoming the last
loss of the Argentine Air Force during the war.
Another significant effect of the actions of the
Canberras (and Hercules) during the night was a
couple of Canbelow missions that were carried out by
HMS Invincible on June 4 th and 7 th . The idea was to
position the carrier closer to the continent and shoot
down any enemy plane that tried to approach the
Islands. On the 4 th heavy fog prevented the British
from launching the Harriers even though there were
two Canberras on a bombing mission. On the 7 th a
couple of Harriers were sent to chase a bogey (a C-
130?) but this turned back to the continent before they
could intercept it.
In balance, the squadron flew 33 successful
sorties (meaning that they were able to reach the
target and drop their bombs). There were in total 236
flights and B-l 11 and B102 were the planes flown the
most. But in terms of successful sorties the ones that
flew the most were B-l05 and B-108 (shot down
during the last mission as seen above). During these
missions the Canberras dropped a total of 38.6 MT of
bombs with the loss of three crewmembers and one
POW.
After the war
Their activities continued but gradually less hours
were flown each year. A Bendix RDR 1400 radar was
installed on B-101 (and used it during the war) and on
B-l04 and B-l07 after the war. It is believed that the
asymmetrical configuration led to the accidents that
destroyed two planes in 1982 and 1983 respectively.
As a consequence this equipment was removed from
B-101. The role of the planes switched from bombing
to photography. Very few hours were flown in the
‘90s with B-102, B-105, and B-l 12 being removed
from flying in 1998. There were now only three
planes left (B-101, B-109, B-l 11) that kept on flying
training missions and air shows. The final official
flight of the Canberras in Argentina took place on
April 5 th 2000.
Pablo Calcaterra (SAFCH #1728), Canada.
Notes
1. OF = Orden Fragmentaria: Information on
mission send ahead of the mission itself.
2. SHAR is the code used by the Argentine
controllers for the Harriers.
3. An Aviso is a small ship very lightly armed.
4. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_Alferez_Sobral_(A-
9).
References
1 Dios y los Halcones (Pablo Carballo)
2. Halcones de Malvinas (Pablo Carballo)
3. Historia Oficial de la Fuerza Aerea, Volumen 6
(Malvinas), Book 1 and 2
4. BAC Canberra BMk62 & TMk64 (Jorge F. Nunez
Padin)
5. Guerra Aerea en las Malvinas (Benigno Andrada)
6. Falklands Air War (Hobson)
7. www.canberrasargentinos.com
With thanks to
EC , Pablo Carballo, Exequiel Martinez, Marcelo Siri
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
119
1
Fokker F.VIIa/3m Trimotor in LVA Service
or
Converting Airliners into Bombers in time of War
Frits Gerdessen
Convinced that the Dutch economy could never
financially support a strategic bomber force, the
Luchtvaartafdeeling (LVA) considered that, in the
event of war, they would relay on converting Royal
Dutch Airlines (KLM) civilian aircraft into bombers.
This idea, as far as known, was first raised in 1925.
On 1 December 1925, KLM, possessed 18
airliners. Ten of these (1 DH.9, 2 Fokker F.II, and 7
F.III) were powered by the 240 hp A.S. Puma and
each could carry only 400 kg of bombs. The LVA
considered this bomb load insufficient. The remaining
8 KLM transports (2 Fokker F.III and 6 F.VII) had
380-400 hp engines that made them usable as
bombers. (A Koolhoven FK.31 was also listed among
the KLM aircraft, but this was a military two-seater
that was never used by the KLM.)
In 1926, the wartime organization of the LVA
included, on paper, one and later two bomber units
(Bombardeer Vliegtuig Afdelingen, or BomVA). In
wartime, these would be equipped with converted
KLM aircraft. The crews would be KLM pilots since
nearly all were LVA reservists. It was optimistically
assumed that a Fokker airliner could be converted
into a bomber within a few days - provided the
military equipment was available.
Fokker had military versions planned for nearly
all types from the F.VII on, as well as for a number of
un-built projects. The original single-engine F.VII
appeared in 1924 (5 built). This was followed by the
F.VIIa with by a single radial engine - of which 40
were built. Next came the famous F.VIIa/3m; a
trimotor version of the F.VIIa. The military version of
the F.VIIa/3m was the F.VIIa/3mM - military
conversions of F-type airliners had the suffix M
added to the type number. The LVA would order
three F.VIIa/3mM out of a total of 18 built. (Note 1)
The LVA Fokker F.VIIa/3m
Even if it turned out to be feasible to turn airliners
into bombers after the start of a war, the LVA realized
that it would be necessary to have some multiengine
Fokkers of its own in peacetime to provide night-
flying training for bomber crews and to serve as the
nucleus for a bomber force. Thus, in December 1927,
three F.VIIa/3mM were ordered from Fokker in two
contracts One contract was for two newly-built
aircraft at / 47.500 apiece. The other contract was for
the civil-registered H-NAEA for / 40.000. (This is
the aircraft that had been used for a pioneering flight
to the Netherlands East Indies by Lt. G.A.Koppen.)
H-NAEA was brought to the same standard as the
other two except that it lacked the photo hatches in
the floor.
The first two F.VIIa/3mM were given serials 801
and 802, and fuselage numbers (rompnrs.) 5034 and
5035. (Note 2) They were accepted on 21 February
and 9 March 1928 respectively. Aircraft 803 (ex H-
NAEA, rompnr. 5006) was accepted on 8 May.
However, on the 25 th , the undercarriage of 803
collapsed and the wing was damaged. After repairs,
its civil registration was cancelled on 28 February
1929. On 10 April, 803 crashed again - this time due
to engine failure while taking off from Soesterberg.
With the LVA reorganization on 1 February 1930,
the Proefvliegtuigafdeling (PVA = experimental unit)
received the three F.VIIa/3mM. The PVA was to be
the nucleus for wartime bomber units (augmented
with KLM aircraft). In the first years, the PVA did a
lot of experimenting with bombing, sometimes with
all the F.VIIa/3mM at once. The F.VIIa/3mM could
carry 700 kg of bombs on racks under the fuselage:
4x50, 3x100, and 4x50 kg. Tests were also made with
the bombs mounted within the fuselage, but
information about this installation is no longer
available.
The F.VIIa/3mM were intensively used for a
variety of tasks: training, night flying, a flying
classroom for four observers and wireless operators,
transport (e.g. a trip to the RAF Display at Hendon in
1931), topographic photography (Note 3), observer
corps training, representing the enemy during
exercises, etc. For observer training, racks with small
practice bombs were carried.
In 1937, the PVA was incorporated into the
Strategische Vliegtuiggroep (Strategic Group). By
1939, the LVA’s F.VIIa/3mM were well worn, but
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Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
802 had been overhauled and in 1939 it was issued to
the Observer School. Once the current observer
course was finished, a new one was not started, and
802, normally based at Haamstede, was often used as
a hack, e.g. transporting personnel with their bicycles
on weekend leave from Texel. The 801 and 803 now
were completely worn out and on 23 March 1940 the
D.LVB (Directeur Luchtvaartbedrijf = Director
Military Aviation Factory) asked the IML (Inspecteur
Militaire Luchtvaart) for permission to retire them.
The IML replied on 4 April, but his answer is not
known. On 2 May, 803 brought a crew from Schiphol
to Soesterberg to ferry T.5 852, which was
undergoing repair, to Fokker.
Airliners into
Let us now turn our attention to the question of
the feasibility of converting airliners into LVA
bombers after a war breaks out. On 19 March 1935,
the CGS (Chef Generale Staf) asked the C.LVA, kol.
P.W. Best, about the status of the planned conversion
of KLM aircraft into bombers. After consulting with
Fokker, on 23 August, kol. Best reported that apart
for the purchase of eight sets of bomb racks (Note 5),
NOTHING had been done to prepare for the
conversion. Fokker said it would take up to one year,
depending on aircraft type, to have the KLM aircraft
converted. Kol. Best considered the F.VIIb/3mM and
the single Koolhoven FK.48 unfit for military use
though usable as a trainer, transport, and ambulance.
He divided the other possible types into 3 groups:
1. F.VIII, F.IX, F.XII, F.XVIII, and F.XX.
2. F.22 and F.36.
3. Douglas DC-2.
For all of these aircraft, the passenger
accommodations had to be removed and the airframe
locally strengthened, hatches and gun positions had to
be installed, wiring and military equipment fitted, etc.
In addition, each group needed a different approach.
Group 1: These aircraft were similar in
construction to the F.VIIa/3m and required only small
modifications. It was quite easy to fit an armament
consisting of one fixed and two flexible machineguns.
The available bomb racks could be installed on all
aircraft of this group. At the time, this group consisted
of 15 aircraft, 14 of which were usable. The 15th was
the twin-engine F.VIII with a different engine type
and this was earmarked for the Flying School.
The new OLZ, Gen. H.G. Winkelman, who
succeeded Gen. Reijnders on 6 February 1940,
inspected the Dutch defenses from the air with an
F.VII. He found this most instructive and he advised
local commanders to do the same. Thus, 802 piloted
by It. F.J.A. Lutz, came to Soesterberg from
Haamstede and made several flights from 27 March
until 4 April. Lt. Lutz received assistance from
personnel of 2-V-2 LvR, the resident Fo kk er D.17
unit. (Note 4)
The 802 was lost at Haamstede during the
German invasion on 10 May 1940. Nothing at all is
known about the fate of the 801 and 803 during the
war days.
Bombers?
Group 2: These large four-engine aircraft were in
a class of their own. The fuselage nose had to be
removed and replaced by one with a gun turret. Aft of
the wing, two gun turrets and a gun in a bottom hatch
had to be fitted. Ground clearance did not allow bomb
racks under the fuselage, but these could be fitted in
the luggage compartments in the wing and also
carried under the wing.
Group 3: The all-metal DC-2 had the best
performance and load-carrying capacity. Due to the
monococque construction, the fuselage needed
considerable strengthening around each new hatch
and gun position. The wing construction made it
impossible to carry the bombs at the centre of gravity
and, therefore, four bomb bays were projected: two in
front and two aft of the wing. The bombs would be
carried vertically. Wing racks were also possible.
Retractable upper and bottom turrets would be
installed, and a fixed nose cannon was possible. (Note
6 )
The time required for the conversion was also
calculated. Production of parts would take about four
months for groups 2 and 3, and considerable less for
group 1. Actual conversion of the F.22 and F.36
would take 6 weeks; for the other types 4 weeks. This
would be followed by a test period of Y/i-2 months.
Fokker considered conversion possible in four weeks,
provided all preparations (design and production)
were completed. Kol. Best considered that it would
take a full year before a plane could be converted.
Since the costs of re-conversion to airliners also had
to be taken into account, Kol. Best concluded that
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
121
conversion of KLM aircraft to bombers was now The new plans for a wartime organization, drawn
impractical, not to say useless. In case of up by the IML from 1936 until 1938, included a 3-
mobilization, the LVA needed to have bombers plane night BomVA with the F.22s and the F.36. This
available at once. He did see some possibilities of idea was dropped and, after offering them to the ML,
obtaining some of these airliners for second-line use. KLM sold the aircraft to England; the RAF later used
Kol. Best argued that, in case of war, the LVA had to them as flying classroom.
strike at once and in force. Holland had to have The CGS (Chef Generate Staf), Lt.Gen. Reijnders
sufficient bombers of its own available in peacetime (Note 7), reported on 5 November 1935 to the MoD.
to react at once to an attack. It would be bad for the He supported kol. Best's conclusions and added some
populations' morale to undergo bombings without remarks of his own. The CGS considered requiring
striking similar blows to the enemy. What kol. Best KLM, at government cost, to include modifications to
and gen. Reijnders may have thought, but did not future aircraft to make them easily convertible for
mention, was that with the current situation, a war military use. KLM was not interested. It would still
would be over long before the converted airliners take several weeks before these aircraft would be
were available. The CGS considered that the LVA operational. In addition, to prepare for the conversion,
needed at least two 9-plane BomVAs available at all the purchase of at least one aircraft of each type
times. This provided the arguments needed for the would be required,
purchase of bombers and was a factor in the decision
to order the Fokker T.5. Frits Gerdessen (SAFCH #12), The Netherlands.
Notes
1. The famous F.VIIb/3m airliner, with a larger FK.49 served with the PVA and was later also used as
wing (there was no single-engine F.VIIb), appeared in a transport and a twin-engine trainer. The LVA might
1926. From 1927 on, Fokker received large orders for have had another multi-engine aircraft, the Pander S.4
the type. The F.VIIb/3mM was the bomber version of Postjager. This trimotor plane was to be converted
the F.VIIb/3m. Apart from bomb racks, these military into a fast reconnaissance aircraft after returning from
versions usually had one fixed synchronized the Melbourne Race. But it was lost at Allahabad,
machinegun in the nose, another in a dorsal position India, and the funds were put to better use to order
on a Scarff ring, and a third mounted in a ventral one more C.X.
hatch. The performance of these military versions was 4. The logbook of Lt. Lutz mentions all these
about the same as their civilian counterparts. The flights and the 2-V-2 personnel (sgts and cpls) who
F.VIIb/3mM bomber was never built by Fokker, but accompanied him. One of the soldiers who flew with
Plage & Laskiewicz in Poland and Avia in Lutz told the author of this article that on several
Czechoslovakia built the type under license. Loring, flights an NCO let a soldier (conscript) take his place,
in Spain, built three for the Aviacion Militar. Several This change was not recorded in the logbook so that
civil F.VIIb/3m ended up in the military, e.g. two in the NCO could cash in his flight pay, / 2,88/hr. In
the Netherlands East Indies and several in Belgium this case, regular/professional ML personnel (sgts.)
and Spain. misused their position to earn some extra money. The
2. Fokker used separate series for wings and mobilized personnel of the ML consisted mainly of
fuselage. The rompnummer (fuselage nr.) is the c/n. reserve officers, NCOs, and conscripts. The
The vleugelnummers (wing nrs) were different from conscripts had to serve one year of basic training and
the rompnummers. practical service at Soesterberg. Thereafter, they
3. By 1934, the LVA decided that a special could be mobilized. The LVA/ML had three inputs a
aircraft was required for mapping duties. Fokker year of about 50 conscripts each, some of whom
offered the F.XIV PH-AEW, a one-off trimotor cargo became sgts.
aircraft but the LVA considered this type 5. Two sets of bomb racks had been purchased
uneconomical. Therefore, Koolhoven was asked to for the F.XII and six sets for the other types These
construct a suitable type that emerged late in 1935 as bomb racks were used after all. The production of
the twin-engine FK.49. It even had a dark room. The racks for the Fokker T.5 had been much delayed, and
122
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
by the time Holland was invaded in May 1940 only
two T.5 had modem racks capable of carrying 200
and 300 kg bombs. Thus, the available racks had to be
used as an interim measure. Yet there were not
enough racks to arm all 16 T.5's. As a result, most T.5
could only carry 50 and 100 kg bombs. On patrols
they usually carried a total of 400 kg of bombs.
(Consult the author’s T.5 Profile to leam more about
the bomb racks for the T.5.)
6. At the same time the C.LVA was studying this
matter, Fokker had worked out how the DC-2 could
be converted into a bomber. This was done on request
of the Kriegstechnische Abteilung of the
Eidgenossisches Militardepartement of the Swiss
Flugwaffe. The Swiss were interested in the military
use of Swissair's DC-2s. Fokker responded to the
Swiss on 26 June 1935 and he also sent his report
with drawings, performance data, etc. to kol. Best,
who in turn informed the CGS. Fokker had calculated
the cost of conversion of one Swiss DC-2 made
available at Schiphol: Design and calculation, etc.
/ 23.000, conversion / 29.500, and flight and systems
tests / 16.000. Fokker could produce and fit
retractable turrets for / 18.000. This amounted to
/ 88.500 per DC-2. The unit price would be reduced
if more than one aircraft were to be converted. The
price was without armament. The Swiss considered
the DC-2 conversion impractical and too expensive
and took no further action. Yet they seem to have
ordered Swissair to require that the purchase of new
aircraft have modifications to enable an eventual
speedy conversion for military use. That was
discussed with Koolhoven for the purchase of the
FK.50 by Alpar. (Koolhoven designed a bomber
variant of the FK.50 for Spain, but this was cancelled
at the start of the Civil War. However, the Republican
government ordered 4, but that order was changed to 4
FK.51).
7. In peacetime the CGS was the highest military
authority, as Lt.gen. CGS Lt.gen. I.H. Reijnders
automatically became OLZ (Opperbevelhebber Land-
en Zeemacht, Commander in Chief of Army and
Navy and a 4-star General) when Holland mobilised
in 1939 (it was the same with Gen. C.J. Snijders in
WW1). He disagreed with the MoD and government
about the defense arrangements and tactics and
complained he was too restricted. In addition, the new
MoD (lt.col. A.Q.H. Dijxhoom) had been a CGS
officer, thus subordinated to lt.gen. Reijnders.
Reijnders could not swallow that a former subordinate
now was his superior. In February 1940 Gen.
Reijnders resigned and was replaced by (already
retired) Gen. H.G. Winkelman. Winkelman got more
a free hand than Reijnders and was much more
flexible (and much easier to go on with).
Fokker Military F.VII/3m Specifications
F.VIIa/3mM
Three Armstrong Siddeley Lynx 218 hp. Span
19.30 m, length 14.80 m, height 3.90 m, wing area
58.5m 2 . Top speed 180 km/h, cruising speed
140 km/h, climb to 3000 m 26.4 min. Empty weight
2400 kg, total weight 3600 kg (crew and equipment
600 kg, fuel and oil 600 kg). Reference: LVA data
sheet 1938. Armament: As far as known, the LVA's
F.VIIa/3mM had one fixed gun and one on a Scarff
ring in a dorsal position.
F.VIIb/3mM
Projected as bomber, troop transport, and colonial
policing aircraft to be powered by 3 Wright
Whirlwind 420 hp engines. Span 21.7, length 14.5,
height 3.9 m, wing area 67.5 m 2 . Crew: 4. Loaded
weight 5300 kg [lighting, radio, etc. 200 kg; crew
(4) 320 kg, fuel and oil for 650 km 700 kg, military
load 880 kg], Top speed 240 km/h, cruising speed
200 km/h. Range of action 650 km. Climb to 5000 m
in 29 min. Absolute ceiling 6000 m, practical ceiling
5500 m. Armament: 2 fixed MG low in the nose, one
or two dorsal guns on Scarff mounts, 2 MG in side
windows (for passengers?), and one MG in bottom
hatch. Bombs in forward part of passenger cabin:
Fo kk er bomb racks 3 x 100 or 6 x 50 kg.
Later, the performance of the F.VIIb/3mM was
recalculated with 3 Wright J6, R975, 320 hp. Speeds
210/180 km/h. Dimensions the same. Empty weight
3150 kg, loaded weight 2150 kg (crew 320, armament
470 kg, equipment 320 kg, fuel and oil 1040 kg). As
for equipment and armament for the type as a
bomber, a data sheet dated 8 Sept. 1930 mentions:
350 kg: radio 60 kg, 3 MG 50 kg, 1500 rounds 65 kg,
lighting 60 kg, bomb-racks 100 kg, miscellaneous
15 kg. Bomb load e.g. 4x200 = 800 kg,
18x50 = 900 kg.
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
123
Fokker Type Numbers
In Germany during WW1, Fokker type numbers were
according to the orders of the German Fliegertruppe. First
a letter indicating the type: C = armed two seat biplane and
D = armed single-seat biplane. This was followed by a
Roman numeral, e.g. D.VI - the 6th D-type ordered from
Fokker. Between letter and number was a space. NO
hyphen. Instead of a space a dot can be used. The
advantage when using a word processor is that the type
designation will not be “broken” at the end of a line. That
can also be prevented with a HARD space.
When Fokker set up in Holland, the type designation
system was continued with the addition of F which by late
1918 indicated “Femaufklarer” (long range recce plane).
At the end of WW.l, the Fokker F.I was not finished
and it was converted to a passenger aircraft, but was later
abandoned. Instead the F.II was built. Thus, Fokker F
types became airliners. Other new type letters:
B flying boat
CC cruiser
DC two-seat fighter
FG glider
G heavy fighter
S trainer
T bomber/torpedo
In the early twenties, the type designations were
sometimes confused. Both Arabic and Roman numerals
and various type letters were used and some projects just
had a name. After some years, it was decided to use
Roman numerals, but in the late thirties again Arabic
numerals appeared in documents, drawings, and
publications. The reason was that the Roman numerals
became quite long, e.g. D.XVII, F.XXII, F.XXXVI. These
became D.17, F.22, F.36, C.10, D.21, D.23, etc.
The problem is where to make the change. We may
e.g. use Arabic numerals for B.5, C.5, D.16, F.7, S.4, and
T.4.
In case a type was projected as both land- and
seaplane, the suffix L(and) or W(ater) was added. Military
versions of civil aircraft had the suffix M.
It must be stressed that German WW.l types must
NEVER be written with Arabic numerals. However, this
does not apply to the factory type numbers, e.g. Fokker
used the M-series M.1-M.22 and the V-series V.1-V.45.
In the twenties Fokker did not use factory type nrs. A
project got a type number, and when it was abandoned,
that number would be reused. Thus there were e.g. 3 types
C.VII.
From 1934, project numbers were introduced, starting
with 101. This series continued well after WW2 in the
300 ? s. Yet in the thirties several types, e.g. the S.9, had no
project number.
Frits Gerdessen (SAFCH #12), Netherlands.
National Markings and Colors of Dutch Military Aircraft
As early as December 1913, at least one Dutch military
aircraft (Farman LA2, possibly also LA3) had orange
roundels under the bottom wing. On 5 August 1914, order
was given to have the orange roundel under both wings of
biplanes. We can say that the private venture of It. van
Heijst (LA2) was adopted. Later a fuselage roundel was
introduced, as well as an orange rudder.
However, in the Netherlands East Indies, they were not
satisfied with the orange marking because it resembled too
much the Japanese meatball. Thus, in January 1920 a
roundel with red, white, and blue sectors, and an orange
centre was introduced. This marking, in six positions, was
also adopted in Holland in July of 1921. In addition the
rudder was painted red-white-blue.
At first, the roundel was painted on in all possible
orientations. Therefore, in January of 1933, an order was
issued. Red, white, and blue should be applied clockwise, in
that order. The dividing line blue-red should be vertical on
the fuselage and parallel to the centre line on the wings.
Also the correct position and size of the marking was
specified.
In 1938, discussions started about the visibility of the
markings. A test was made with a red-white-blue-orange
ring marking on a T.5 (860). This was not adopted. A
smaller marking was also discussed. On 15 January 1939,
the red-white-blue on the rudder(s) was dropped.
The shooting down of T.8W R-5 in September 1939
prompted the introduction of a new marking. The roundels
on the C.7W were over-painted orange with a black border.
This form was not to be adopted. On 23 September 1939, a
new marking was ordered - an orange triangle, with a 10 cm
black border, as large as possible halfway on the wings and
on the fuselage. The rudder was to be painted orange with a
10 cm black border.
From 1920, the combat aircraft were generally painted
dark olive green on the upper surfaces and pale blue on the
undersides. Trainers were pale blue overall. In 1938,
camouflage was introduced on the new combat aircraft:
Fokker T.5, D.21, G.l, and Douglas DB-8A/3N. These
aircraft had dark brown under surfaces.
Frits Gerdenssen (SAFCH #12), Netherlands.
124
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
Fokker F.VIIa/3mM in LVA Service
All photos from the collection of F. Gerdessen
‘801’ during tests with the Nationaal Luchtvaat Laboratory FVIIa/3mM ‘802’
Fokker Airliners that were Considered for Conversion to Bombers
All photos from the collection of F. Gerdessen
Small Air Forces Observer Vol.35, No.4 (140) April 2012
127
F.XII PH-AFL at Waalhaven F.XVIII PH-AIP at Schiphol
Fokker Airliners that were Considered for Conversion to Bombers
All photos from the collection of F. Gerdessen
128
Small Air Forces Observer Vol.35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
F.36 and D.17 ‘209’ T.5 ‘857’ over the beach at Schevebingen summer 1939 (Metzar)
The Korean People’s Air Force
in the Fatherland Liberation War
Part Four: Regroup and Try Again
Douglas C. Dildy
Battling “Operation Chromate”
On the morning or September 15 th , the first of six
battalions of the USMC’s 1 st and 5 th Marine
Regiments came ashore at Wolmi-do Island, just off
the port of Inchon, with the rest of them landing along
the waterfront at Inchon that afternoon. The naval
bombardment, air strikes, and the 1 st Marines
destroyed the two 76.2mm artillery batteries of the
KPA’s 918 th Coastal Artillery Regiment and drove
the 2,000-man 226 th Naval Infantry Regiment from
their prepared defenses, this unit’s various
disorganized elements retiring towards Kimpo AB
with 25% casualties.
The next day the North Koreans began to organize
a defense centered on the holding the airfield against
the approaching Marines. As the senior North Korean
officer west of the Han River, the KPAF’s Gen. Wang
established the 1 st Air Force Division, consisting of
his own 877 th AFU, under Major (Maj.) Kung Chan-
So; the 107 th Security Regiment, led by Colonel
(Col.) Han Choi-Han; and the survivors of the 226 th
Naval Infantry Regiment - a force totaling about
3,000 men, but these were widely dispersed in small
groups with little or no communication between them,
or with Wang’s HQ on the airfield.
Early on September 17 th , Wang launched a
handful of sorties with the few combat aircraft that
remained operational at Kimpo AB. These include
two to four II-10s and (apparently) a single Yak-9P.
Just before dawn, the Shturmoviki launched the first
two of four anti-shipping sorties. At 0555hrs, two of
these located the line of cruisers anchored in the
channel off Wolmi-do Island to provide naval gunfire
support for the Marines ashore. After flying from
north to south down the line of anchored ships at
1,000ft (330m), the leading 11-10 turned and made a
shallow diving attack on the USS Rochester, the
flagship of the “Operation Chromate’s” naval
commander, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble.
Two bombs were dropped, one of them glancing
off the cruiser’s aircraft handling crane on the stem,
both exploding in the water. The second attacker
(reported by nearby HMS Jamaica to be a Yak-9)
also dropped two bombs, both falling wide. The two
KPAF aircraft then turned and strafed the HMS
Jamaica with 20mm cannons and were greeted with
AA fire. One RN sailor was killed and another two
wounded but the second attacker was shot down, the
aircraft banking left and flashing across the bow to
impact the water about 30yds/m beyond the ship.
Meanwhile, the advancing 5 th Marines approached
Kimpo, investing the airfield on three sides. The
situation was so dire that Col. Han abandoned his
107 th Security Regiment and fled across the river to
Seoul. During the early morning hours of September
18 th - from 0300hrs through dawn - the 877 th AFU
launched four sporadic uncoordinated counter attacks
against the 5 th Marines. Attacking piecemeal and
without supporting artillery or heavy weapons, the
futile charges were annihilated, with 395 KPAF
troops - including Maj. Kung - being killed. Gen.
Wang and his few surviving air force members
evacuated across the Han River, leaving Kimpo AB to
the US Marines who reported it secured at lOOOhrs.
On the air base the wreckage of at least six II-10s
and four Yak-9Ps were discovered. In the burned out
hangar were captured - damaged but repairable - two
Il-10s (number “44” and “55”) and one Yak-9P.
These three “trophies” were dismantled and shipped
to the USA where they were repaired, examined and
technically evaluated by the Cornell University’s
(formerly Curtiss Aircraft Corp’s) Aeronautics
Laboratory, then sent to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio,
for flying tests and operational exploitation.
One Last Gasp
When counter-attacking UN forces crossed the
38 th Parallel into North Korea on October 7 th , 1950 -
and showed no signs of halting until the DPRK was
utterly destroyed - the leadership of the newly formed
People’s Republic of China (PRC) began organizing a
massive military “intervention”, sending the 13 th
Army Group (initially twelve infantry and three
artillery divisions) to the Northeast Military Region.
Euphemistically called the “Chinese People’s
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
129
Volunteer Army” (CPVA), its commanders were
critically concerned about their total lack of air cover.
This was because, at this time, the People’s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) consisted only
of one mixed aviation brigade of 155 Soviet-built
fighters, bombers and assault aircraft based near
Nanjing (Note 1) and, at Beijing, an ad hoc unit of
approximately 30 Lavochkin La-9 fighters about to
begin conversion to MiG-9 jets (Note 2). All of these
were undergoing further training with Soviet units in
order to expand them into air divisions, so they were
not available or even prepared for combat duties.
Consequently the PRC’s Chairman Mao Zedong
appealed to Stalin for further assistance. At this time
the USSR had two fighter aviation divisions (FAD) in
China - the 50 th FAD and 151 st Guards FAD (GFAD)
- totaling approximately 200 MiG-15 jet fighters. The
50 th FAD was formed for the air defense of the
Liaodong Peninsula (site of the Imperial Russian Port
Arthur, now Dalian) and the 151 st GFAD was
stationed at Anshan and Shenyang to train the
PLAAF’s 3 rd and 4 th FADs, both of which began
forming in October. (Note 3)
However, Stalin was afraid to confront the
Americans directly and only agreed to protect
strategic Chinese assets - airfields, bridges and
hydroelectric power plants on the Yalu River - and
important rail lines into North Korea. On October 19 th
- the same day that UN forces entered Pyongyang -
Mao Zedong ordered the now heavily reinforced (to
30 divisions) CPVA to cross the Yalu into North
Korea and prepare for counter-offensive operations,
with or without Soviet air support. In fact the only air
cover available was the KPAF’s reconstituted 56 th
“Guards Taejon” FAR. (Note 4)
Since the end of August, Kim Il-Sung had taken
Stalin up on his offer to supply additional fighter
aircraft to the Korean air force. (Note 5) By the end of
October, Stalin’s military envoy to Mao Zedong,
General S. E. Zakharov, informed his chief that the
KPAF now had two dozen operational Yak-9Ps, with
26 qualified pilots, deployed to Antung (now
Dandong) a Chinese border city near the mouth of the
Yalu River. This city was connected by two strategic
road and railway bridges to Sinuiju, North Korea,
where Kim Il-Sung had withdrawn his government
and built a modem air base, complete with protected
aircraft revetments. The Antung-Sinuiju bridges were
two of only six spanning the Yalu and were critical
for tunneling CPVA forces and their supplies into
North Korea. The nearby air base was built to protect
them.
The KPAF deployed 22 Yak-9Ps across the Yalu
to Sinuiju airfield to resume combat operations on
November 1 st . While the 151 st GFAD launched two
four-ships of MiG-15s each from Anshan and
Shenyang (28 th and 72 nd Guards Fighter Aviation
Regiments [GFAR]) to cover the Antung-Sinuiju
bridges, the KPAF launched two four-ships of Yak-
9Ps from Sinuiju to attack American warplanes
bombing and strafing CPVA and KPA units near
Ansui.
About 15 miles south of Sinuiju, near Yangsi, one
KPAF formation found USAF B-26s (730 th
B[L]S)/452 nd B[L]W), being controlled by a NAA T-
6G “Mosquito” FAC (6147 th Tactical Air Control
Squadron). The Yaks split into pairs and attacked
both. Invader gunners drove off one pair, claiming
one Yak-9 shot down, while the nimble Texan dodged
its attackers, calling for help from nearby Mustangs.
By the time the fighters (67 th FBS/18 th FBW) arrived
the enemy had vanished and the FAC directed them to
attack a convoy of oxcarts moving north.
About this time the second formation of Yak-9Ps
arrived and attacked the Mustangs, splitting into pairs
to do so. While they had the element of surprise, their
poor gunnery skills caused their first pass to miss
their targets and in the rather involved maneuvering
that followed two of them fell to the aggressive, hard-
maneuvering and sure-shot Mustang pilots, one of the
KPAF pilots bailing out. While the Koreans admitted
the loss of these two Yaks the survivors claimed to
have shot down two B-29s [sic] and a Mustang.
Meanwhile, back at Sinuiju, an RF-80A pilot (8 th
TRS[PJ]) reported “15 Yaks parked in revetments”
and Fifth AF immediately dispatched an attack by a
dozen Shooting Stars (51 st FIW). The target was
extremely challenging because the airfield paralleled
the Yalu, only a short distance from the river and the
revetments faced north, forcing the Americans to
attack from that direction. Forbidden to fly into PRC
airspace the Shooting Stars were squeezed between
their target and the river and had to roll-in over the
river exposing their bellies to Chinese AAA guns
lining the northern shore. Consequently one F-80C
was lost, its pilot killed, and success was limited.
Soviet sources report “one Yak-9 was burned and
three were put out of action, but it is [sfc] possible to
130
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
restore them”. Finding themselves still vulnerable to
enemy airfield attacks, Koreans withdrew the 16
surviving fighters to Antung, back inside the safety of
their “Manchurian sanctuary”.
The next day the “Guards Taejon” tried again,
sending a four-ship formation against the Mustangs
(12 th and 67 th FBS/18 th FBW) bombing, strafing and
rocketing Communist troops just south of Sinuiju.
The KPAF pilots were reported to be much more
aggressive and skillful in air-to-air maneuvering, but
nevertheless lost two of their number to the more
experienced Mustang pilots.
Finally, on the 6 th six Yak-9Ps took off from
Antung and headed east, climbing for altitude to
“bounce” three F-51Ds on an armed reconnaissance
northeast of Sinuiju. The Mustang pilots saw them
and turned into their attack and in another free¬
wheeling engagement another pair of Yaks was shot
down, one KPAF pilot bailing out successfully.
Having lost six Yak-9Ps in aerial combat with
USAF Mustangs - and with no American aircraft shot
down by them - the 56 th “Guards Taejon” FAR was
once again withdrawn from combat. Coupled with the
FEAF’s increased bombing of the Yalu bridges, the
Soviets were urged to provide increased air cover,
Stalin’s acquiescence on this point resulting in
committing two more MiG-15 divisions (303 rd and
324 th FADs) to the Korean War, thus initiating of the
two-and-a-half year long aerial duel in what became
known as “MiG Alley”.
Doug Dildy (SAFCH #844), USA.
NOTES
1. The PLAAF’s 4 th Mixed Aviation Brigade
completed initial type training under the Soviet 106 th FAD
in June 1950 and consisted of (one regiment each of) 38
MiG-15 jets, 39 La-11 prop fighters, 10 Tu-2 bombers and
25 II-10s (plus 14 Yak-11 trainers). Operational training
continued for another three months and it was not declared
combat ready until October 19 1950.
2. Originally formed in July 1949 to defend Beijing
from Koumintang (KMT or “Nationalist”) bombing
attacks using 30 captured KMT aircraft, this ad hoc
“combat squadron” was re-equipped with a similar number
of La-9s in August 1950. In mid-November 1950, the
Soviet 328 th FAD arrived to train the unit on the straight¬
wing jet-powered MiG-9, expanding the unit into the 14 th
FAD in doing so.
3. The 50 th IAD was originally the 106 th IAD that had
trained the PLAAF’s 4 th Combined Air Brigade at
Shanghai during March-June 1951. That mission complete,
in August it was reformed under its new designation at
Xiansilipu on the Liaodong Peninsula to guard against
possible USN and RN/FAA air attacks. Also in August the
151 st GIAD began arriving at Anshan airfield near
Shenyang to begin training the PLAAF’s 3 rd and 4 th FADs
on the MiG-15 in late October. As the PVA began crossing
the Yalu into Korea, it was ordered to provide air cover
“for the troops of the PLA’s 13 th Army Group... [but] will
not fly across the state border with the Korean People’s
Democratic Republic.”
4. The resurrection of the 56 th GFAR was most
probably accomplished through the Soviet 147 th FAD’s
84 th FAR which was alerted for movement from its base
near Voroshilov, Primorye Region, on September 21 st , and
was ordered to deploy 40 Yak-9Ps via Yanji and Antung to
defend Pyongyang against UN air forces. However, two
days later this unit was substituted with the 32 nd FAD’s
304 th FAR 40 La-9s from Spassk airfield, Primorye, with a
scheduled arrival date of October 3 rd . This unit’s ground
echelon - maintenance technicians, air base personnel,
radio technicians and four radar units, AAA battalion (16
guns), fuel stocks and munitions for 15 missions - were
dispatched on September 25 th , arriving five days later.
However, the UN advances across the 38 th Parallel
threatened the deployment and on October 7 th they were
ordered “evacuated from the territory of Korea”. The 304 th
did not return to the 32 nd FAD (which converted to the
MiG-15) but apparently retired to Jilin, China, became part
of the 297 th FAD and began training the PLAAF’s 9 th FAD
in December, 1950. Because of its quick replacement on
the abortive Pyongyang deployment, it is believed that the
84 th FAR provided Yak-9P training, and then the aircraft
themselves, to the KPAF’s 56 th GFAR.
5. At this point only Yak-9Ps were provided. By this
time the KPAF’s 20 surviving II-10s (see Part 3 of this
series) were apparently only suited for training. These,
along with a few Yak-18s, were moved to Fen Cheng,
about 28 miles west of Antung/Dandong where training
continued, bringing the total qualified 11-10 pilots to 25 by
the end of October. However, in his communication with
Stalin, Gen. S. E. Zakharov reported “but up to now there
are no planes for them.” This was accompanied by a
formal request from Colonel A. Petrachev, the Soviet air
force advisor to the KPAF, for “25 11-10 planes”.
Captions for the photographs that appear on page 143
can be found at the bottom of page 142.
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
131
Table 1
USAF and ROKAF Aircraft Lost to Actions of the Korean People’s Air Force in 1950
Date
Service
Type
Serial No.
Unit
Location
Remarks
25 June
ROKAF
7 L-4/T-6
Training Unit
Kimpo AB
Strafed by Yak-9Ps
25 June
USAF
C-54D
Unknown
MATS
Kimpo AB
Strafed by Yak-9Ps
28 June
USAF
B-26B
44-34379
13 th BS(L)/3 rd BG
Suwon AB
Strafed by Yak-9Ps
Destroyed during evacuation
28 June
USAF
F-82G
46-364
68 th F(AW)S
Suwon AB
Strafed by Yak-9Ps
Destroyed during evacuation
28 June
USAF
C-54D
42-72648
22 nd TCS/374 ,h TCW
Suwon AB
Strafed by Yak-9Ps
29 June
USAF
C-54D
Unknown
6 th TCS/374 th TCW
Suwon AB
Bombed by 11-10s
12 July
USAF
B-29
-69866
28 th BS/19 th BW
near Seoul
Shot down by Yak-9Ps
12 July
USA
L-4
Unknown
US Army
near Taejon
Shot down by Yak-9Ps
13 July
USA
L-5
Unknown
US Army
near Taejon
Shot down by Yak-9Ps
14 July
USAF
B-26B
44-34263
13 th BS(L)/3 rd BG
near Taejon
Damaged by Yak-9Ps;
Landed at Taejon airfield;
Destroyed during evacuation
19 July
USAF
F-80C
49-698
36 th FBS/8 th FBG
near Taejon
Damaged by Yak-9Ps;
Crashed during landing attempt at
Taejon airfield; pilot killed
Table 2
USAF and USN Aerial Victory Claims against Korean People’s Air Force Aircraft in 1950
Date
Type
Claimed as
US Unit
Type
Pilot Name
Remarks
27 June
Yak-11
Yak-7U
F(AW)S
F-82G
lLt William G. Hudson
F-82G S/N 46-383
27 June
Yak-9P
La-7
68 th F(AW)S
F-82G
lLt Charles B. Moran
27 June
Yak-9P
La-7
339 th F(AW)S
F-82G
Maj James W. Little
27 June
2x11-10
2x 11-10
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Robert E. Wayne
27 June
11-10
11-10
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
Capt Raymond E. Schillereff
27 June
11-10
11-10
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Robert H. Dewald
29 June
11-10
La-7
9 th FBS/49 ,h FBW
F-80C
lLt William T. Norris
Note 1
29 June
11-10
11-10
80 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Roy W. Marsh
29 June
2x11-10
2x11-10
80 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-51D
2Lt Orrin R. Fox
Note 2
29 June
11-10
La-7
80 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-51D
lLt Harry T. Sandlin
Note 2
29 June
11-10
11-10
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-51D
lLt Richard J. Burns
Note 2
30 June
Yak-9P
Yak-9
36 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Charles A. Wurster
30 June
Yak-9P
Yak-9
36 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt John B. Thomas
3 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
VF-51/CAG 5
F9F-3
Lt (jg) Leonard H. Plog
BuNo. 123071
3 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
VF-51/CAG 5
F9F-3
Ens Eldon W. Brown, Jr.
BuNo. 123026
15 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
39 th FIS/51 st FIW
F-80C
lLt Robert A. Coffin
17 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
Capt Francis B. Clark
19 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
36 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Robert D. McKee
19 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
36 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt Charles A. Wurster
19 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
36 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
2Lt Elwood A. Kees
20 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
Capt Robert L. Lee
20 July
Yak-9P
Yak-9
35 th FBS/8 th FBW
F-80C
lLt David H. Goodenough
1 November
Yak-9P
Yak-3
67 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
Capt Alma R. Flake
1 November
Yak-9P
Yak-3
67 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
Capt Robert D. Thresher
2 November
Yak-9P
Yak-9
67 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
Capt Alma R. Flake
2 November
Yak-9P
Yak-9
12 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
lLt James J. Glessner, Jr.
6 November
Yak-9P
Yak-9
67 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
Capt Howard I. Price
6 November
Yak-9P
Yak-9
67 th FBS/18 th FBW
F-51D
lLt Henry S. Reynolds
1. This victory credit was not awarded because Lt Norris was one of four pilots scoring hits on the target and FEAF policy precluded “dividing credit
among more than two persons”. Additionally there were no La-7s in the KPAF inventory, so this was either a Yak-9P or an 11-10. Since another
member of this formation shot down was an 11-10, this aircraft was most probably of the same type.
2. While described in Fuller (pg 31) as “Yaks”, the USAF Korean War Aerial Victory Credits has always listed the victims as three Il-10s and one La-7.
Since there were no La-7s in the KPAF inventory, this was either a Yak-9P or an 11-10. Because other members of this formation shot down were II-
10s, this aircraft was most probably that same type.
132
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
The MiG-9 in PLAAF Service
“We consider it absolutely necessary now [for
you] to start moving... to the front from central and
southern China five or six divisions of MiG-9s, which
operate very effectively against bombers.” This was
the message from Soviet Premier Josef Stalin to PRC
Chairman Mao Zedong on 13 June, 1951. At this time
the Soviets were providing air cover for the crucial
bridges spanning the Yalu River with two divisions
(303 rd and 324 th Istrebitelnaya Aviatsionnaya Divisii.
[Fighter Aviation Divisions] or IADs) of MiG-15s but
their “tour of duty” would be completed in six months
and Stalin wanted the PLAAF to assume this role.
During the winter of 1950/51, the USSR had
provided 376 MiG-9s (of 593 single-seat production
examples built) - in the form of six Voenno-
Vozdushnye Sily (“Military Air Forces” or V-VS, the
Soviet Union’s tactical air force) fighter divisions - to
China. These units were responsible for providing
local air defence while spending six months training
equivalent Chinese units: six 60-aircraft fighter
aviation divisions (FADs) as listed in the table below.
First flown in April 1946, the MiG-9 was the
USSR’s first operational jet-powered interceptor,
powered by a pair of the 1,7631b thrust RD-20s
(Soviet copies of BMW 003S Sturm axial-flow
turbojet) beneath small, straight wings and
conventional, all-metal empennage. Capable of
566mph (91 lkm/h) top speed and a maximum altitude
of 44,290ft (13,500m), it met the State’s specified
flight performance criteria.
But its armament appeared to be an afterthought:
two Nudelman-Suranov NS-23 (23mm) cannon
mounted beneath the open nose intake and the
Nudelman N-37 (37mm) cannon awkwardly
embedded in the intake’s bifurcation “splitter plate.”
All three weapons had their long barrels poking out
precariously well ahead of the intake and when fired,
gun gasses flowed directly into engines causing
compressor stalls and flameouts.
Additionally, it had too little wing for its weight,
resulting in poor manoeuvrability, and its RD-20s
guzzled its small 429gal (16251tr) fuel supply, tightly
confining its combat radius. Consequently, the
Chinese were not happy with the MiG-9, believing
(rightly) that the Russians were “dumping” inferior,
obsolescent fighters on them, while charging then full
price!
So when Stalin wanted the PLAAF MiG-9 FADs
(plus two or three new Chinese MiG-15 units) to
relieve his elite, but exhausted, MiG-15 IADs, Mao
replied that it would be better if the Russians re¬
trained three of these units on the more advanced
MiG-15 before sending them into battle.
Consequently, upon completing MiG-9 training, the
6 th , 12 th and 14 th FADs spent another six months
upgrading to the much faster, swept-wing MiG-15.
The Russians maintained that with its short range,
high performance, and heavy cannon armament the
MiG-9 was an effective point defence interceptor and
“bomber-destroyer,” convincing the Chinese to
purchase a large number of (otherwise unusable) RD-
20s to keep their other three MiG-9 FADs flying.
These units were assigned to the PLAAF’s “Anti-
Aircraft Defence System” before they too eventually
converted to the MiG-15, circa 1953. At that point,
the remaining MiG-9s were relegated to fighter
training schools.
Douglas C. Dildy (SAFCH #844), USA.
PLAAF MiG-9 Units 1951-53
Unit
Location
Established
Trained by
Which Arrived
6 th FAD
Anshan, Liaoning
November 1950
17 th Guards IAD
20 November
7 th FAD
Dongfeng, Jilin
December 1950
309 th IAD
10 December
12 th FAD
Xiaoshan Xian, Zhejiang
December 1950
144 th IAD
19 November
14 th FAD
Beijing
February 1951
328 th IAD
14 November
16 th FAD
Qingdao, Shandong
February 1951
65 th IAD
19 November
17 th FAD
Tangshan, Hebei
April 1951
20 th IAD
19 November
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
133
Korean Takichawa Ki-9 Spruce
“Having something in common“
Frans Scheve
When World War Two ended in 1945, the Japanese
IJAAF left a number of planes behind on the neighboring
Korean Peninsula. Examples are: Ki-45 Oscar, Ki-54
Hickory, Ki-55 Ida, and the Ki-9 Spruce.
At this time, Korea was in a state of rebuilding and
restoring its former everyday way of doing, trying to forget
the century-old domination by Japan and its occupation
during WW2. It was also using all available material to
build-up new armed forces for defense, training, liaison,
etc. The northern part of the peninsula was much
influenced by the two neighboring communist countries.
The southern part became more and more a refuge area for
people looking for freedom, individualism, and peace of
mind. At some point there was a difference of opinion of
how to develop the country, which resulted in the Korean
War (1950-1953). This finally ended up in the splitting of
the peninsula into a north and a south territory - a situation
we still have today.
One thing both Koreas had in common was their use
of the Japanese Takichawa Ki-9 code name “Spruce”. An
old nine-cylinder radial-engine biplane mostly used for
training. The southern party used this type mainly for
liaison and training. For the northern party it was a perfect
aircraft to do some nighttime bombing runs down south -
just enough to keep people up all night.
Painting and Markings
A ‘Spruce’ of the northern party - as shown on one of
the accompanying photos - had black Korean or Chinese
characters on the side of its fuselage. When translated the
text reads “School for National Aviation” or “National Air
Force University”. (Asian characters often translate into
different ‘personal’ explanations when translated into
English language.) The plane does not seem to carry any
national insignia and it seems to be painted medium-gray
overall, but this is difficult to tell from the black & white
image. (Perhaps this aircraft retained the former orange-
yellow livery of its Japanese or Manchurian air force
owners.)
The southern party painted their ‘Spruce’ in an overall
dark-green camouflage and used the ancient Korean
Taegeuk symbol as their insignia a Yin-Yang- like symbol
in the colors red and blue. This symbol or insignia is still
used today on South Korean (ROK) military aircraft -
albeit in a modernized form.*
Modelling
If you want to make a scale model of a Korean
Takichawa Ki-9 “Spruce”, then the 1/48 model kit from
the Japanese brand Nichimo is a very good option. There
are many detailed injection molded plastic parts. For
example, the cockpits have detailed seats and dashboards,
separate side-wall frame tubing with equipment, and two
sitting pilot figures, a third figure is supplied in standing
position. The camouflage schemes and the decals are only
for Japanese aircraft, even the color of the plastic -
orange-yellow - has been adapted to this.
The Czech company RS-Models is a very good option
in the 1/72 scale range. It includes nicely-formed injection
molded plastic parts, a decal sheet with Japanese,
Manchurian, and South Korean decals, and an etched
metal sheet with small detailed parts that is pre-painted in
color - even the tiniest dials on the instrument panels are
displayed. RS-Models also issued a second “Spruce” kit.
Basically this is the same kit as described above, but it has
decals and four schemes for Japan, Thailand, Nanking AF,
and Chinese AF, making it an excellent opportunity for
modelers to build a Ki-9 of an exotic small air force.
*The Korean red and blue Taegeuk symbol ( Eum-Yang )
finds its origin somewhere during the 7 th century AD. It
apparently even predates the Chinese black & white Taoist
Yin-Yang symbol. The symbol represents the harmony
between opposite forces; heaven and earth, light and dark,
winter and summer, soft and hard, sun and moon. The
color red represents Heaven, blue stands for Earth, and the
white surrounding represents the traditional “white-
clothed” Korean people.
Frans Scheve (SAFCH #890), the Netherlands.
Explanation of notes on the drawings
A. The rudder is painted completely medium red. G. Dark-sea-gray propeller blades.
B. Yellow tail band, denoting it to be of the Allied forces H. Black Chinese/Korean characters.
in Korea. I. Blue and white US star and bar insignia.
C. The “Taegeuk” symbol is in six positions. J. The underside shows several sections where the
D. Dark-green overall. original orange-yellow paint shows through.
E. Rust-brown engine exhaust. K. A black white outlined capital ‘K’, denoting it to be of
F. Medium-red engine cowling. the ROKAF.
134
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
A “Spruce” of the southern air force. (ROK).
This former Japanese Tachikawa Ki-9 was painted dark green overall. The national insignia - Taegeuk
- was applied in six positions. The engine cowling and tail-rudder were painted red. ( See Pictures I & II
and photo #13, SAFO 138, page 56).
A “Spruce” of the northern airforce (DPRK).
The northern forces used slow flying and hard to detect small ‘trainer’ aircraft - like this Ki-9 - for night
time missions dropping small bombs. The purpose of this was to annoy Allied forces by keeping them
out of their sleep, hence their nickname “Bedcheck Charlie”. ( See Picture III).
A “Spruce” of the combined US and southern (ROK) armed forces.
One Ki-9 had a very interesting mixed combination of ROKAF and USAF insignia. The yellow tail band
and black white outlined ‘K’ denotes it to be of the Allied forces in Korea. ( See Picture IV ).
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
135
136
Small Air Forces Observer Vol.35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
All photos are from public domain internet pages
Congolese Mustang Could-have-beens
Leif Hellstrom
Considering the many different air arms in the Congo in
the 1960s, and the many and varied ways of aircraft
procurement, it is not surprising that many proposed deals
never came true. What is surprising, however, is that three
of these concerned P-51 Mustangs in different forms.
Katanga
The air force of Katanga, the Avikat, was the first one to
consider obtaining Mustangs. Aero Enterprises in Elkhart,
IN, USA, supposedly offered five Mustangs to Katanga in
June 1961. These have been tentatively identified as
N4143 A/44-74445, N5444V/44-73751, N6300T/44-
73163, N6318T/44-74602 and N8677E/ 44-74865. But this
deal fell through.
In late September 1962, UN intelligence began
hearing rumours of Mustangs being shipped from South
Africa to Katanga. The reports were considered “not
likely” and were in fact untrue, but may have been
triggered by another, apparently more serious deal.
Arms dealer Pierre Laureys sold many things to
Katanga. His last deal is said to have been for 14
Mustangs, at a cost of $ 3 million. Katangan President
Tshombe is said to have paid the first million on purchase
and a second million on shipment, but the second check
bounced. The Mustangs had reportedly been bought from
Israel, with Portuguese assistance.
Information about the Mustang deal circulated among
the Avikat mercenaries and the rumours were more
persistent than usual, even if some pilots dismissed them
as “only dreams.” The information was also quite specific
and Avikat pilot Jimmy Hedges wrote in his diary on 17
December 1962 that 14 Mustangs were to be delivered in
28-30 days. By 14 January 1963, they were due at Lobito
Bay harbour in seven days. Over the following couple of
days Hedges wrote:
I believe that Mustangs have been paid for too - but that
may also be a rumour [...] Maybe - just maybe, we get
our Mustangs & carry on from Henrique de Carvalho.
By this time the Avikat was in exile. Avikat commander
Jan Zumbach planned to base the Mustangs in northern
Angola, perhaps at Henrique de Carvalho, with Portuguese
permission. To return the favour, the aircraft would also be
used against Angolan rebels based in Congo.
A surprise attack on the UN fighter base at Kamina
was planned and this would likely have been one of the
first missions for the Mustangs. The rumours of Katangese
Mustangs did have the UN fighter pilots worried, since the
Mustang had good performance and enough endurance to
wait until the UN jets had to land and then pick them off
on final approach.
Hedges noted in his diary on 30 January 1963 that he
had heard that several Mustangs were already unloaded at
the Angolan capital Luanda and that one was being
assembled by Portuguese Air Force technicians. That is the
last mention of Mustangs and soon afterwards the Avikat
mercenaries were dismissed and dispersed.
The story about Mustangs from Israel is quite
interesting and fits rather well with the 1961 IDF/AF
retirement date of its Mustangs. At that time some 30
Mustangs remained and many are unaccounted for. It is
just possible, therefore, that some were in fact sold to
Katanga, although most unlikely that any actually arrived
in Angola. Some reports talk of four to six aircraft rather
than 14, and that would seem a more reasonable number.
If the Mustangs had in fact been delivered, it is likely
that they would have retained their IDF/AF camouflage on
arrival, but with all Israeli markings removed. The Avikat
was not known for any elaborate finishes and would
probably have retained the existing paint job.
By this time the Avikat had long since stopped
carrying national insignia on its aircraft and the markings
would in all likelihood have been restricted to just a serial
number with a “KA” prefix (the earlier KAT prefix had
also been dropped), applied by hand on the fuselage sides
and above the right wing, and maybe under the left wing,
similar to the markings on the Avikat Harvards. The serial
range KA-55 to -59 was vacant and might have been used
for the Mustangs, if there were not too many of them. Had
there indeed been 14 of them, KA-140 and up, or perhaps
KA-135 and up, might have been used for the Mustangs.
United Nations
It is only fitting that the Avikat’s main adversaries, the
United Nations’ organization in the Congo (known as
ONUC) would also have been considering the use of
Mustangs.
By late 1962, the UN was desperately seeking aircraft
to augment its fighter force in the Congo, which had been
depleted with the departure of the Ethiopian F-86 Sabres
and the Indian Canberras. UN Headquarters were
searching high and low for possible alternatives and were
also pressuring the USA to provide a fighter unit.
In mid December 1962, one of the suggestions put
forward by UN Secretary-General U Thant was that the
USA should provide six Sabres and four Mustangs to the
ONUC fighter base at Kamina in Katanga. The aircraft
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
137
were to be serviced by US personnel but flown by
Ethiopian and Swedish pilots. Most likely the Mustangs
would have been flown by Swedes in this case, since the
Ethiopians had no experience of similar aircraft.
In the event, of course, no Mustangs were provided
and instead Sabres were obtained from various countries
(see SAFO #132). The US Air Force no longer had
Mustangs in service in 1962 but there were large numbers
of surplus aircraft readily available in the USA. Had any
been supplied, they would likely have been late model F-
5IDs, still largely in WWII configuration but no doubt
with upgraded radios.
Most of ONUC’s combat aircraft had a natural metal
finish, apart from some of the SAAB J 29s which were
camouflage painted, and it is perhaps most likely that the
Mustangs would also have remained natural metal.
But there is a chance that ONUC would have chosen
to paint them overall white, retaining an Olive Drab or
black anti-glare panel. They would most likely have
carried “ONU” titles in blue or black in six positions.
Those on the wings might have faced forward on one side
and to the rear on the other, or they might all have faced
forward. A blue or black serial would have been applied to
the fin, possibly in the 600 range which was the first free
ONUC number block. The typeface would be anybody’s
guess, but ONUC often used squarish lettering. A light
blue and UN flag, probably placed on the fin, would no
doubt have completed the picture.
Congolese Air Force
The Congolese Air Force, the FAC, was wholly dependent
on foreign support for the first several years of its
existence. The CIA, in particular, was operating most of
the FAC’s combat aircraft, but CIA support was largely
withdrawn in 1967, and with it the B-26 Invaders provided
“on loan” in 1964. The FAC T-6s were also retired from
combat operations and all the FAC had left were T-28s.
The Congolese were still woefully short of pilots but were
still eager to obtain more and better aircraft.
The British air attache reported in December 1967
that the Americans were trying to sell Mustangs to the
Congolese, at $ 90,000 a piece. These were no doubt
Cavalier modified aircraft, either Cavalier F-51Ds or
Cavalier Mustang IIs with additional underwing
hardpoints. The Cavalier Mustang with wingtip tanks
would in fact have been quite suitable to the Congo, where
there was little opposition and where endurance and range
were important. But the Congolese were set on obtaining
jet aircraft and bought Macchi MB 326Gs instead.
Cavalier Mustangs procured through the US military
were usually either overall light grey or had a USAF
South-East Asia style camouflage pattern. The latter might
have been used for any aircraft delivered to the Congo.
National markings in dark blue, red and yellow were
carried on the fuselage and sometimes above one wing
(usually the right) and under the other one. A Congolese
flag would have appeared on the fin.
FAC practice at the time was to give its aircraft a
serial prefix consisting of the letter F plus a type letter,
perhaps FC in this case. The number was normally the last
three digits of the aircraft’s previous identity. The
Cavaliers would perhaps have been in the cancelled USAF
serial batch 68-15797 to -15809, in which case the FAC
serials might have been FC-797 and up, painted in white
flanking the fuselage national insignia.
Leif Hellstrom (SAFCH #786), Sweden.
Half a dozen retired IDF/AF Mustangs literally put out to grass
in the 1960s. It is possible that some of these had been among
the aircraft reportedly sold to Katanga in 1962 through an arms
dealer, and even partially paid for. (Amos Peleg via Shlomo
Aloni)
Mustang N6356T as used in the 1968 film “The Mercenaries,”
set in the Congo. It was overall shabby white with green, white
and red-orange (center) roundels. Some have called these
roundels “Katangan,” but they were probably just a misinformed
attempt to depict an Indian UN aircraft. (Barry Flahey)
138
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
The drawings on this page are hypothetical only and must not be taken to show actual aircraft paint schemes:
the Mustang in the event never entered service with any of the air forces depicted here.
F-51D Mustang “KA-56” of the Aviation Katangaise, based at Henrique de
Carvalho, Angola, January 1963. The aircraft retains its former IDF/AF colour
scheme. The fuselage serial and the name “Babette II” are painted in white.
F-51D Mustang “603” of the UN Fighter Wing, Kamina air base, early 1963.
The text “ONU” and the serial are in dark blue. UN flag is light blue and white.
—I
Dark Green
FS 34079
.
' '
Medium Green
FS 34102
Tan
FS 30219
Light Gray
FS 36622
Cavalier F-51D Mustang “FC-798” of Force Aerienne Congolaise, N’Djili
airport, Kinshasa, 1968. Painted in US SE Asia colours with white serials.
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
139
-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-books-
Fokker G-l ‘Le Faucheur’: Jachtkruiser
- deel 1, Frits Gerdessen, et al. 248 A-4
pages. Hardbound. ISBN 978-90-8616-
110-2. Published by Lanasta, Slenerbrink
206, 7812 HJ Emmen, Netherlands.
Website: www.lanasta.com. Price: €
36.95 which, at the time this is written, is
equivalent to $50.00.
The Fokker G-l :Jachkruiser (Hunter
Cruiser) was the most advanced Dutch
aircraft in service at the time of the
German invasion in 1940. Because of its
heavy armament, it received the
nickname “Le Faucheur” (The Reaper).
This, the first of a two-volume set,
covers the development of the G-l from
the Hispano-Suiza powered prototypes,
to the Twin-Wasp powered G-l built for
the Spanish Republicans (but never
delivered), to the Mercury-powered G-l
built for the Dutch military.
The book is profusely illustrated
with well-reproduced photos of G-ls
under construction, under test, and in
service. There is also a plethora of
original Fokker sketches, 3-view
drawings, and documents.
There is a chapter on foreign interest
in the G-l, none of which ever came to
fruition because of the rapid pace of
events proceeding WW2. A final section
covers the proposed follow-on projects
including the G-2 and G-3.
Sprinkled throughout the book are
some very attractive color illustrations.
Some of these are of the prototypes and
the early-production a/c in Dutch
markings, while others are of the ‘what-
if’ type showing the G-l in the colors of
potential users. In the former category
are: G-l at the Salon de l’Avion in Paris
painted in attractive colors; X-2 at the
time of its first light, X-2 after repairs, X-
2 after installing new engines, 301 with
Mercury engines, 302 during test flights,
and 304 with an observation ‘bathtub’ for
a third crew member. In the ‘what is’
category are G-ls shown in Spanish
Republican, Danish AF, Swedish AF, and
Estonian AF markings.
The text is entirely in Dutch, except
for English captions to the
photos/illustrations and a short, but
confusing, 3-page English summary.
The production standards of the book
are outstanding: the pages well-printed
on quality paper and sturdily bound
between hard covers.
A second volume, covering the
operational use of the G-l is scheduled
for publication in 2012. (Don’t let the
cover painting mislead you. All the
photos in this first volume of G-ls in
service are of ones carrying the pre-WW2
Dutch national markings. This would be
a much more appropriate cover for
volume 2.)
Books also promised by Lanasta for
2012 include “Fokker C.5” and “Fokker
D.21”. All of these will be eagerly
awaited by enthusiasts of the small air
forces.
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WWW.MAXD M XL SX'ME
Antarctic Helicopters Pt. 1 . 1/72-scale
decals. Max Decals #7222. Max Decals,
67 Skreen Road, Navan Road, Dublin 7,
Ireland. Website: joe@maxdecals.com.
It’s great to see Joe Maxwell
producing decals after an absence of
several years. And, very fine decals they
are.
This set, the first of two new sets,
provides decals for 12 different
helicopters that have been operated by
various nations in support of Antarctic
scientific missions over the past fifty
years. Aircraft covered are: (1) Sikorsky
S-55 Grupo Aeronaval Antartico
Argentine Navy 1968; (2) USN Sikorsky
H04S-3 from the icebreaker USS Glacier
1956; (3) USN Sikorsky HUS-1L
"Kingpin II” VX-6 in 1957; (4) USN
Sikorsky LH-34 operated by VX-6 in
1965; (5-6) Bell UH-IB US Army, 2
schemes 1962-63; (7) Bell 212
Uruguayan Air Force, ca .mid 1990’s; (8)
AS332B Super Puma, Argentine Army
circa mid 1990 ? s; (9) Bell UH-ID US
Army, 1969; (10) Bell 412, Chilean Air
Force, 2009; (11) Bell UH-ID US Navy
VX-6, 1970; (12) CH-101 on board
Japanese icebreaker Shirase in 2010; and
(13) Bo-105c Uruguayan Navy in 2010.
The decal sheet (125 mm by 200
mm) is excellent - superbly printed in
vivid colors and in perfect register. The
8-page, full-color instructions provides
all the views necessary for the correct
color scheme and the placement of the
multitude of insignia and markings. As
you can see from the above list, the
enthusiast of the small air force has not
been neglected.
Since all helicopters operating in the
Antarctic carried high-visibility
markings, this set allows modelers to add
some very colorful aircraft to their
collections.
Ordered directly from Max Decals at
the website above, the price is €12
including postage. A 1/48-scale sheet,
covering fewer helicopters, is also
available at the same price.
140
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
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PBY Catalina: FCM 72 043 Part 01.
Website: www.fcm.eti.br.
This is the latest in a long line of
excellent decals from FCM of Brazil.
Featured on the 130 mm by 160 mm
decal sheet are all the national insignia,
Antarqui Decals reports sales of their
decals have been slow. If you have been
considering buying any of their decals,
now is a good time to act to encourage
Antarqui to continue releasing decals for
exotic small-air-force subjects.
All Antarqui decals are of good
quality and printed over the background
color of the aircraft. This avoids the
tedium of cutting around the smaller
items, but does require the modeler to
match the paint to the color of the
background.
Antarqui decals can be obtained
direct from: Antarqui Decals, 757 Emory
St. #106, Imperial Beach, CA 93032,
USA. antarquidecals@ yahoo.com. Or,
from the SAFCH Sales Service:
safo@redshift.com.
The most recent Antarqui releases
are:
unit insignia, codes, serial numbers,
lettering, and stenciling for three “short
tail” Catalina amphibians: (1) Brazilian
PBY-5, FAB 8185, 2° Grupo de Patulha,
Brazil, 1945. Colors are standard USN
intermediate blue over off white. (2)
Argentine PBV-1A Canso A, 2-P-10,
Escuadra Aeronaval n° 2, 1956, in
painted overall in aluminum. (3)
Argentine Catalina Mk.II, 5-P-7, Grupo
Aeronaval de la Flota, 1958. Colors for
the latter Catalina are a very attractive hi-
viz scheme of aluminum mid fuselage
with gloss dayglo red bow, rear fuselage,
and wing tips, with gloss yellow upper
surface of the wing.
The two-sided instruction sheet
consists of full-color side-view drawings
and partial top- and bottom- view
drawings of all three aircraft. All colors
are identified by their FS595 equivalents.
A smaller sheet shows the locations of
the stenciling on both surfaces of the
wing.
There is a minor problem with the
instructions. The partial top- and bottom-
Antarqui Decals
*
■ m-
Hawker Hart Floatplane: Estonia.
Blackburn Shark Mk.II Floatplane:
Portuguese Air Force. 1/72-scale decals.
This set consists of two decal sheets:
one for Estonian Hart ‘146’ and one for
Portuguese Shark ‘2’. The Estonian sheet
(100 mm by 55 mm) has four Estonian
triangles and rudder stripes as well as the
‘146’ with shadow shading - all in the
correct black, blue, and white. The
Portuguese sheet (80 mm by 40 mm) has
four national insignia, rudder stripes with
Portuguese crest, and serial ‘2’ and ‘74’
all nicely printed in red, green, yellow,
and black. (This is not a repeat of the
Novo decals, but an entirely new
presentation). The instructions advise that
floats for the Hart can be taken from the
Shark kit, but they are also available in
view drawings of the two Argentine
Catalina show an anchor on the upper
port wing tip and one on the lower
starboard wing tip. The modeler is left to
guess what is on the other wing tips.
Since there are four anchors on the decal
sheet, it probably is safe to assume that
anchors were carried in all four positions.
To verify this assumption, I consulted
Jorge Nunez’s book PBY-5A Catalina
(Serie Aeronaval #13), where I found a
full top-view drawing of 5-P-7 showing
anchors at both wing tips. From the
photos in this book, I think it is safe to
assume that anchors appear at both tips
on the undersurface of the wing.
This is an excellent decal set that
allows the modeler build a “Cat” in a
most unusual and attractive color scheme.
These decals are available from the
SAFCH Sales Service for $10.00 plus
postage ($0.50 US; $1.00 rest of world).
vacuform or resin from Antarqui. [Ed: If
the floats are taken from the Shark, the
Shark can be built as a landplane in
RCAF markings.] This double set cost
$5.00 plus $1.00 postage.
Ryan STM 150: Guatemala. 1/48-scale
decals.
The Guatemalan STM’s had the
front seat covered over and machineguns
mounted in above-wing pods. The decal
sheet (105 mm by 90 mm) consists of
four national insignia, blue/white/blue
rudder stripes, two black ‘24’ for the
vertical fin, and the long black fuselage
flash with colorful ‘owl’ badge. The
instruction sheet has scale drawings of
the gun pods that can be either scratch-
built or ordered from Antarqui. These
decals cost $4.00 plus $1.00 for postage.
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
141
-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-letters-
“Just a quick note to let you know
that the Latin American Aviation
Historical Society's website is up and
running once again. Please pass the word
to all SAFO members so they can visit us
and create their own access accounts. The
site can be found at:
http://www.laahs.com. So far, we only
have only a member's forum, but we hope
to start publishing historical articles again
in the near future.”
Mario Overall (SAFCH #1548),
Guatemala.
“Since Aeroclub Models no longer
exists, Broplan kits are no longer
available from England, The best place to
buy my kits is the Aviation Megastore in
the Netherlands.
“This month I will send my newest
kits for review. I hope these will be of
interest to SAFO readers.”
Janusz Brozek (SAFCH #1297), Poland.
“I have a couple of small additions to
the article on the Paraguayan Police Air
Fleet that appeared in SAFO #139: The
4th Paraguayan Police UH-1H arrived in
Paraguay July 2011 and is ex CC-CBL
c/n 9495. R.44, serial A-01, had an
accident on 18 April 2010 and another
R.44 received the same serial that was
used during the repairs of the first A-01.
The first A-01 was in use again by
September 2011, and for awhile two
R.44's with the same serial A-01 were in
the hangar at Villa Hayes. The c/n's of
the two A-l's are not known, but the
engine number of the first is L33927-48E
(A-02 eng.no. L33989-48E, A-03 eng.no.
L33990-48E).”
Bram Risseeuw (SAFCH #1717), Ireland.
“I just picked up a 1/72-scale decal
sheet from Hannants - it is Authentic
Decals, #72-19 for the Mi-24V/P Hind
E/F. One of the subjects is a Hind-F for
Abkhazia. The roundel consists of
white/green/white rings around a central
red circle, with a white star on the circle.
There is also a roughly-painted green
patch, obviously to represent an over¬
painted Russian marking. It is BRIGHT
green, with number 03 in yellow stencil.
My main question: is that a correct
coloring for the patch, or should it be a
more military color? Is there a source for
a (preferably color) photo of this aircraft?
Anyway, thought it might be of interest.
“The other markings are for Russian
Army Aviation (2), Russian "Federal
Boundary Service", Georgian Army, and
the Russian Golden Eagles
Aerobatic/Display Team, in addition to
the Abkhazian "Forces of Self-Defence
of Republic Abkhazia (per the
instructions). That certainly qualifies as
Small Air Force!”
Tom Hampton (SAFCH #613), USA.
-disposals-disposals-disposals-disposals- disposals- disposals- disposals- disposals-
Disposal: Em cleaning out the SAFO
files of items not of direct small-air-force
interest. The following are available:
Panzer Grenadier Division
Grossdeutschland, 176 pages
Squadron/Single Publications, $15.00;.
The following soft-cover books are each
$10.00. Pansergrenadiers in Action 50
pages; Weapons #5, Squadron/Signal
Publications; Aviation Art of Frank
Wootton, 43 color plates. Carrier
Fighter, Mizrahi, 72 pages. Sentry Book.
USAF Aircraft of Today, Sgarlato,
Squadron/Signal Publications; 102 pages
(1978). Superfortress, Birdsall,
Squadron/Signal Publications, 80 pages
(1980). Republic Thunderbolt,
Freeman. Ducimus Classic; 72 pages.
Checkertail Clan, McDowell. Aero
Publishers, 98 pages. Battle of Britain,
Shores. Aircam Aviation Series #S.l.
Arab Air Forces, by Charles Stafrace.
Squadron/Signal Publications. 64 pages,
b&w and color photos, color profile
drawings. On all items postage and
packing are extra. Contact
safo@redshift.com.
Free Kits: A-1H Skyraider, 1/48 scale,
Monogram #5454. BAe Hawk T.Mk 1A,
Red Arrows, 1/48 scale, Premiere
#P3102. Two of each available.
Messerschmitt Me 163B, 1/32 scale,
Hasegawa #JS-087:700. One available.
You pay only for packing and postage.
Contact safo@redshift.com.
Captions for the Photos on page 143
As US, ROK and other UN ground forces advanced northwards in the autumn of 1950, they overran a number of KPAF bases. The
derelict II-10s strewn about these bases offered mute testimony to the size - and the destruction - of the KPAF at the start of the war.
1. Yonpo was a former IJAAF base that was the home of one
squadron of II-10s belonging to the 57 th Assault Aviation
Regiment. During their evacuation, the unit left behind a
number of derelicts; this one was probably serialled “102”.
(Richard Pechner via Doug Dildy)
2. Wonsan was a former IJNAF air base and depot closer to
the front/3 8 th Parallel. Once the initial offensive moved
south, the Yonpo squadron deployed there to support KPA
units advancing through the central highlands and down the
rugged east coast. Battered by FEAF and USN air raids, by
the time that it was overrun during the UN counter¬
offensive, it was only home to a number of derelict II-10s,
most of them pulled, pushed and bulldozed into a comer of
the airfield. (Richard Pechner via Doug Dildy)
3. More derelicts at Yonpo. Based on the fact that “X02” was
also found here, this aircraft was probably numbered in the
100-109 series, with the third digit on the missing mdder.
Note the FEAF or ROKAF F-51D and USMC F7F-3N
Tigercat from VMF(N)-513 in the background. (Wayne
Jackson via Warren Thompson)
4. Meanwhile on Korea’s west coast, the 57 th Assault Aviation
Regiment’s Heijo (Pyongyang) squadron had deployed
forward to Kimpo AB, where it was devastated by USAF
bombing and strafing raids. 11-10 #54 was probably “bellied
in” (note bent propeller blade) during operations, stripped of
useful parts - including its outer wing panels - and dragged
into a nearby field where it was found by advancing UN
troops. (Bill Williams via Warren Thompson)
142
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
Small Air Forces Observer Vol.35, No.4 (140) April 2012
143
PLAAF MiG-9, red 86104, on display at the Chinese Armed Forces Museum at Beijing. It wears a “tiger stripe”
camouflage pattern of light/yellowish and dark/olive green, very similar to that used by Soviet (and PLAAF and
KPAF) La-11 night-fighters during the Korean War. (Yu Ming via Doug Dildy)
PLAAF MiG-9 (white 30) on display at the Chinese Aviation Museum at Datangshan, near Beijing. It is painted
overall dark green over grey, the standard Soviet scheme for training aircraft. (Mark Pasqualino via Doug
Dildy)
144
Small Air Forces Observer Vol. 35, No. 4 (140) April 2012
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